



LSAT^{*}

Practice Test

PrepTest 36 with Experimental

Explanations



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SECTION I: LOGICAL REASONING

1. (A)

Joanna says that a company emerging from bankruptcy must (“the only way”) change its business. Yet Ruth is quick to point to such a company that diversifies and succeeds in a way that Joanna deems “futile.” Simply put, that’s a “counter” to Joanna’s “claim,” (A).

Ruth “explains” (B) how the Kelton Co. turned itself around, but that’s not an “alternative” to any “phenomenon” Joanna describes. An analogy (C) is a declaration that two unlike things share some significant similarity; but Kelton is an example of a once-bankrupt company, not an analogy to one. Both Joanna and Ruth’s claims are concrete, and neither accuses the other of ambiguity (D). And if anyone here is “excluding a plausible alternative” (E) it’s Joanna, who refuses to accept that a company cannot change its nature after bankruptcy and become successful.

2. (A)

The nutritionist denies the usefulness of juicing by asserting that there’s no nutritional difference between eating a piece of produce and drinking it juiced. That’s the key evidence; sentence 3, and the gist of it is: You can eat a whole carrot, save \$100, and get the same benefit. But what if eating solid food is problematic? (A) offers a scenario in which people would be wise to purchase the juicer in order to get the benefits of produce.

As an argument against juicing, (B) is a 180. Affordability (C) isn’t the issue; necessity is. (D) implies that the nutritionist only knows about “early prototypes” and hence isn’t hip to the current state of juicing, but the whole mess is outside the scope. (E) draws an irrelevant comparison between vitamin pills and the nutrients in produce. This is not an argument that produce needn’t be consumed at all, just that one needn’t buy an expensive juicer to consume it.

3. (C)

The defense goes like so: Mikkeli cannot have plagiarized Halden, because he doesn’t read the only language in which Halden was published, and no reviews exist. That argument hinges on the assumption that there’s no other plausible way in which Mikkeli could have gotten close enough to Halden to rip her off. How about the intervention of a third party? That’d do it. So (C) is right: The author is assuming that no third,

Norwegian-literate party passed on to Mikkeli the substance of Halden’s work. If (C) were false the plagiarism charge would gain plausibility, so Mikkeli’s defender must be depending on (C).

A possible meeting between the two authors (A) would have no necessary impact on the plagiarism charge because there’d be no reason to suspect that such a meeting involved exchanging manuscripts. Mikkeli has no Norwegian, so the Halden book’s popularity in Norway (B) has no impact on whether Mikkeli plagiarized it. (D) would be more correct if it pointed to the *absence* of a myth at work in both author’s books; as it is, a common myth can only tie the substance of the books together and make Mikkeli’s defense weaker, not stronger. And since there’s no evidence of Halden’s knowing or working in Old Icelandic (E), whether or not Mikkeli knows it has no impact on the plagiarism charge.

4. (C)

(C) merely paraphrases the last sentence’s assertion that at least some people taking antidepressants are going to gain a little weight.

No injunction to doctors, of any sort, is built into the paragraph (A), nor is any recommendation to patients (B). It may be that the alleviation of one’s depression outweighs (pardon the pun) any additional poundage accompanying it. Or maybe not. But we can deduce nothing from the paragraph either way. (D) contradicts the first sentence: It’s the drugs that cause the weight gain, not “lack of dieting.” And (E) both contradicts the text (the implication is that weight gain is inevitable and hence that weight *maintenance* is *impossible*) and presumes that those taking antidepressants must care about the accompanying weight gain, when in fact they might not.

5. (A)

The policy is to be utterly impartial, which means no favoritism shown to anyone, but also no discrimination either. The principle says to treat family members no better and no worse than anyone else. The problem with (A) is that the refusal to hire siblings who are clearly better than any other applicants is, by the rule of the principle, discriminatory.

Since the right answer violates the policy, then the four wrong choices must all be *consistent* with it. (B) is impartial because all complainers get the same free sample. (C) and (E) are impartial as worded, because it’s possible that (C) the three siblings and the family in general are so good that there’d be no reason to fire

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them or that **(E)** the promoted family member is the best candidate. (Firing, or refusing to promote, outstanding family members would be just what the principle is opposed to.) Perhaps the family members are actually unqualified, but **(C)** and **(E)** don't mention that, and the choices as written are all we have to go on. **(D)** has no problems with the principle either, since the refusal to promote is clearly based on cause. One might protest that two years of good work ought to wipe out an employee's bad work history, but that'd be a value judgment independent of the principle.

6. (D)

The author says that those who believe that chocolate-eating can cause acne “[mistake] an effect for a cause,” but that doesn't mean that those people reverse the two. She goes on to specify that both are effects, that it's stress that causes both chocolate-eating (which sentence 1 says people believe is a cause) and acne. All of that is summed up by **(D)**. To the author, chocolate-eating and acne are a correlation, and both phenomena share an independent cause.

The author doesn't contradict those who see acne appear after a big chocolate binge **(A)**; indeed, since both are caused by stress, she'd be surprised if they *didn't* occur together. **(B)** reverses the stress → chocolate-eating relationship posited by the author. **(C)** creates an unwarranted comparison between two phenomena—stress and acne—that are in a cause + effect relationship, not an opposed one. Causes of chocolate-craving **(E)** are outside the scope of chocolate-eating. One can crave a foodstuff without eating it, and vice versa. The author never mentions craving.

7. (B)

The author bolsters her belief as to the true cause + effect by citing scientific studies (the “additional evidence” of which **(B)** speaks), studies whose results question the sentence 2 evidence that people think supports the “widespread belief” of sentence 1. Each phrase of **(B)**'s has a parallel in the argument.

All five choices look good without a prephrased idea of the right one. As noted with regard to question 6 above, the author doesn't “question the accuracy” of the chocolate/acne correlation; rather, she reinterprets that connection, so **(A)** distorts the logic. Since the author accepts the chocolate/acne correlation that is part of “everyday experience,” she is hardly “dismissing it out of hand” **(C)**, nor is she relying on the mere authority of science over common sense. The

chocolate/acne correlation is *consistent* with science's view of the role of stress, so **(D)** is a 180. And **(E)** seems to think that the author is concerned with the time sequence of cause + effect—i.e. which “precedes” the other?—when that has no role in her logic whatsoever.

8. (D)

While conceding the need for equal TV time for shows about social issues, the author denies that need when it comes to shows about scientific issues, on the grounds that social issues are political and can't be settled...the implication being that scientific issues are totally different. Any choice attacking the assumption that social issues and scientific issues are mutually exclusive must therefore weaken the logic, and **(D)** does just that. If **(D)** is true, by the author's own logic there would be a strong rationale for offering equal time for at least some scientific TV shows.

(A) is a 180, strengthening the argument by driving an even greater wedge between social and scientific issues. The number of opposing views, whether it be 2, 3, or more, is not fundamental to the author's reasons for agreeing to some equal time but not all **(B)**. By stating that “social issues almost always” are political and “seldom can...be settled,” the author leaves the door open for exceptions, so when **(C)** points out those exceptions his logic is undamaged. **(E)** ventures into the utterly irrelevant issue of what TV networks are willing to do. The argument's logic can hold, or falter, whether equal time is granted willingly or under duress.

9. (B)

What's “puzzling” is that grapes and raisins sound identical—the caramelized sugar and the loss of water seem to be the only differences—and yet the latter have “more iron per calorie.” Those differences must not be negligible, however; there must be something else going on. **(B)** provides it by asserting that the caramelized sugar's calories aren't part of the raisin's calorie count. As a result, we can infer that while the grape and the raisin have the same *amount* of iron, the latter's fewer counted calories mean that it has more iron **per** calorie.

The ¶ is about rates but **(A)** is about amounts; its comparison has no effect on the *per calorie* iron content. Meanwhile, **(C)**, **(D)**, and **(E)** all describe events about or surrounding the *ingestion* of grapes and raisins. But the paradoxical difference in iron-per-calorie exists long before anyone eats the fruits, so these three choices are all beside the point.

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10. (C)

References to circular arguments, those that “presuppose what they seek to establish,” are usually made in LSAT wrong answers, but once in a while a genuinely circular argument comes along. This argument assumes that Cotrell is a lousy writer in order to prove that he’s a lousy writer, and that’s what circular reasoning, choice **(C)**, is. The author provides no independent evidence whatsoever as to the quality of Cotrell’s writing. Indeed, there is actually counterevidence—the “superior” articles—that Cotrell is better than the author gives him credit for, but the author blithely ascribes them to someone else, again with no independent support.

(A) is a popular wrong answer, but since the author explicitly *acknowledges* that the counterevidence of the superior Cotrell articles exists, he cannot be said to “ignore” it. If anything, the author takes the bad Cotrell writing from which he is reasoning as *typical* rather than atypical **(B)**. No outside expertise **(D)** is cited or even alluded to, and **(E)** is a total 180: Rather, the author infers limited ability *despite* what he sees as occasional examples of *high* performance.

11.

(D) is inferable from the this policy manifesto’s sentences if they are taken in reverse order. Since all gardening equipment is on sale, and since no sale item can come back for a refund, **(D)** is self-evidently true. It would be equally true to state that “No home appliance is returnable for a refund.”

(A) goes way beyond the scope to speak of “any item”; this set of policies deals with sale items only. And since we cannot infer, from policies about sale items, anything about *non-sale* items, **(B)** isn’t inferable either. **(C)** is a 180, since at least some construction tools—the ones that have been “selected” to be on sale—can be returned for store credit like any other sale item. And *non-sale* construction tools, if any, might well be returnable for a refund, so we can’t infer **(E)**.

12. (E)

The author draws his conclusion by drawing what he takes to be a telling distinction between the CPI’s measure of the price of goods *sold*, and the innovations that can reduce the cost of goods *produced*. But these are two different things, and so the conclusion based on this distinction is utterly unwarranted. Even if all the economic jargon blurred the author’s scope shift, perhaps reasoning backward

from **(E)**’s wording would have made that scope shift stand out.

The author commits a scope shift, but the four wrong answers simply go beyond the scope. The conclusion has to do with “sometime” differences in the value of government benefits, so **(A)**’s suggestion that those differences might not occur is useless. As described to us, the CPI isn’t measured, or used, any differently depending on which goods and services are involved, so **(B)** is off topic too. **(C)** ventures into the area of retiree purchasing behavior—it’s never mentioned, just as **(D)**’s appeal to the future vs. the past never comes up in the argument.

13. (C)

A simple rephrasing: How can astronomers in September have “correctly” attributed the comet’s greater brightness to its breakup, when the breakup wasn’t observed until two months later? If the breakup had begun earlier and unobserved, that’s how. **(C)** explains how the brightness could have increased prior to the observation of the comet’s breakup, and removes all conflicts among the statements.

(A) is a 180 in that it deepens the mystery of how the brightness could have begun in advance of the November sighting. **(D)**, too, if anything deepens the paradox, since it describes brightness-creating activity prior to November. Two choices relate to irrelevant causes of brightness **(B)** and comet breakup **(D)**. Neither speaks to the disjunction between the September hypothesis and November observations.

14. (E)

Attack a formal logic inference by starting with the most concrete fact; you can expect the statements to have been presented in a less than helpful order.

Slater will win (sentence 3) unless the polls are wrong. So suppose they’re not; suppose they’re accurate. If so, Slater’s victory will trigger (sentence 1) McGuinness’s appointment—an appointment for which Yerxes is more qualified (sentence 2). **(E)** sums up this precise chain of cause-and-effect; the “someone” of which **(E)** speaks is of course McGuinness.

(A) has two major problems. Sentence 3 tells us nothing about who will win if the polls turn out inaccurate; and nothing in the ¶ describes circumstances under which Yerxes, or any other superior candidate, would be appointed. **(B)** ignores the possibility that a winning candidate other than Slater might appoint McGuinness anyway; the ¶ never said that *only* Slater would appoint him. **(C)**’s either/or

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leaves out multiple other possibilities, notably a third possible appointee to head the commission. To assert that Yerxes is more qualified because she's an architect with 15 years of commission membership doesn't necessarily mean that McGuinness is the opposite on both counts **(E)**. Maybe he's an architect, too, with fewer years on the commission. Or maybe he has 15+ years, but isn't an architect. There is no way to tell.

15. (D)

The correct principle must match up, in every relevant respect, with the concrete situation described.

The right answer will reflect the premise that that there's no disadvantage ("did no worse," "performed no better") to using a crude mockup device in place of a sophisticated final product. It must also "justify" the conclusion that buying the sophisticated product isn't always necessary. **(D)** underlies the choices of both the engineering students and the military personnel to proceed with the cheap, equally effective substitutes.

(A) and **(C)** draw irrelevant comparisons between the civilian engineers and the military trainees; both fail to see that the author uses both scenarios to make the same point. Neither selection of training device hinges on the expertise of the users **(B)**. And both the civilian and military examples see the trainees using one tool, not a "variety" **(E)**.

16. (C)

"Inference" means don't try to predict the answer; merely understand the individual statements and look to the choices for the one that *must* be true.

(A)—Not enough data are provided to make this determination. If anything, the fact that each of the six economically viable countries named has a relatively small population suggests that population size may *correlate* with viability.

(B)—No countries, economically viable or not, with a population greater than 7M are mentioned, so **(B)** is impossible to deduce.

(C)—Must be true, since four economically viable countries are named, each of whose populations is no larger than 1/4 of 7M.

(D) is contradicted by the second sentence's assertion of the "most significant indicators" of viability, and **(E)** creates an unwarranted (and outlandish) comparison among four of the factors mentioned.

17. (E)

In parallel reasoning, abstract the text in simple terms.

The argument boils down to "Start from the ending, so you can go back to create the process that leads to the ending." That holds true for the creation of a good mystery or, choice **(E)**, the making of a great tennis shot.

None of the others advises starting at the end and working back. Indeed, **(A)** is the exact opposite, suggesting "first things first." **(B)** would be closer if it suggested deciding on the desired vegetables and then preparing the soil accordingly, but as written just describes a two-step process. **(C)** deals with speed and extemporaneousness in its first clause, and the need to interrelate two factors in its second clause, none of which is anything like the recipe for a good mystery. **(D)** recommends multiple strategies when the stimulus, and **(E)**, recommend only one.

18. (D)

"Since" signals evidence, and "..., since" signals that the conclusion preceded the comma.

You have to shuffle the clauses around a bit to see it, but the logic is tight as a drum **if** the study data are correct. If they are, then moderate exercise lowers blood cholesterol, which lowers the risk of hardened arteries, which lowers the risk of blood clots causing arterial blockage. Again, that's all speculative based on the "if," But since the conclusion (clause #1) *definitively asserts* that last lowered risk, the author must be assuming **(D)** that the "if" is true and that the data are correct.

(A) doesn't meet the definition of an assumption ("unstated evidence the author takes for granted"), because the nature of the study is asserted explicitly in the final sentence. Prevention of arterial blockage **(B)** isn't necessarily the same as "lowered risk," and even if it is, **(B)** is stated in the opening sentence, not implicit. **(C)** is stated, too, in the second clause of the stimulus. And the author need not be taking for granted what hardened arteries do **(E)** since every fact cited is about lowering risks, not raising them.

19. (C)

When a flaw is present, start with the assumptions the writer made.

A huge scope shift takes place between the evidence (the patriotism of Arton's nation was quite low) and the conclusion (any patriotism in Arton's plays must have been insincere, ironic). The author must be assuming

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that Arton had to have personally shared the mood of her countrymen, but certainly that need not be the case, as **(C)** points out; it's just as likely that she was genuinely patriotic and bucked the prevailing trend.

(A) draws an unwarranted comparison between two factors in the nation that the author presents as co-equal. The author denies the patriotism of Arton's work not, as **(B)** would have it, because patriotism and serious writing are incompatible, but because he thinks that patriotic writing can't be done when the nation's mood is morose. Since his evidence is based on "general morale," the author's logic would allow for exceptions of the type that **(D)** cites. And no such confusion as **(E)** describes exists; rather, the author finds sincerity (of patriotic writing) to be incompatible with low citizen morale.

20. (E)

For assumptions, look for something in the conclusion that needs to be connected to the evidence.

The conclusion that "justice isn't ensured in the legal system," the final clause, comes with a necessary condition ("to X, citizens must Y") in the *first* sentence: Citizens have to be able to criticize their society's judges. However, that's the last we hear of citizen criticism. We **do** learn, in the evidence cited in the final sentence, that citizens lack expert knowledge. So the author must perceive some sort of connection between citizen ignorance and citizen criticism, and **(E)** provides just that. We know that the author is counting on **(E)** to be true because if **(E)** is false, then despite their lack of expertise, citizens **still** might be able to criticize their judges and ensure justice, contrary to the author's conclusion.

All we hear about is what citizens don't know, not what they believe **(A)**. **(B)** offers another necessary condition for ensuring justice, but that's beside the point of *this* one. **(C)** defines a legal system's "primary concern," something the author takes no position on so he certainly need not be assuming it. And **(D)** draws an unwarranted distinction between details cited in the second sentence, in no way connecting evidence and conclusion as an assumption does.

21. (A)

Finding a parallel flaw involves the same method as finding any parallel argument.

The value judgment that the listener's copy of Kostman's painting won't be accurate is based on the lack of accuracy in the original painting. The idea

seems to be that the next generation must repeat the sins of the previous one, an idea repeated in **(A)**.

To choose **(A)** you don't even have to delve into the real problem with the logic—namely, the scope shift from evidence to conclusion—because the structure of all of the other choices deviates so wildly from the structure of the stimulus. **(B)**'s structure includes an "unless" exception nowhere paralleled in the stimulus. **(C)** offers two if clauses, not present in the original, and a shift from resemblance to identity that is also unique to **(C)**. "But" in and of itself kills **(D)**, since the original offers no counterpremises; and the fact that **(E)**'s conclusion is based on two pieces of evidence is enough to break any possible parallel with the stimulus.

22. (C)

When a question deals in formal logic, start with the most concrete facts.

Since all poets seek personal expression (sentence 2), and since all writers who seek personal expression sometimes used words ambiguously (sentence 1), it must be true that all poets sometimes use words ambiguously. OK so far?

The conclusion brings in two brand-new terms, namely "readers' enjoyment" and "precise understanding," in its assertion that (paraphrasing here) all poetry readers' enjoyment depends on things other than precise understanding of meaning. The right answer must connect those new terms to the evidence presented, and **(C)** does just that. Without **(C)**, there could be—contrary to the conclusion—readers of poetry whose enjoyment depends on precisely understanding what poems mean.

(A)'s reference to what readers "try to attain" distorts the terms of the argument; the author is not concerned with readers' efforts, any more than he cares **(B)** whether writers are concerned or unconcerned with their readers' reactions. The structure of the argument does not hinge on any statement about "most" anything, whether poets, readers, or writers in general **(D)**. And the readers of whom **(E)** speaks are totally irrelevant to the readers of poetry who are the subject of the author's conclusion.

23. (E)

In an all EXCEPT question, be sure to characterize the 4 wrong and 1 right answer.

Since lamps were used for cavelight during the entire Upper Paleolithic period, one would expect to find lamps or lamp artifacts dating from the entirety of the

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period—early, middle, and late years—and in pretty much equal or symmetrical quantities. However, the distribution is “skewed”—the most lamp evidence comes from the late Upper Paleolithic—so the four wrong choices will either clarify why there are so few lamps from the earliest Upper Paleolithic years, or why there are so many lamps from the later years.

There’d be little surprise at finding few cave lamps from the early Upper Paleolithic period if we knew that identified artifacts of all types from that period are rare **(A)**, or that caves from that period may have relied on fire pits as an alternative light source **(D)**. As for **(B)** and **(C)**, both deal with the Magdalenians, mentioned in the stimulus only as the dominant culture in the period of greatest lamp evidence. The greater number of unearthed Magdalenian sites **(B)** would certainly explain the discovery of so much lamp evidence there. So would the more efficient lamp-making techniques of the Magdalenians **(C)**, since “efficiency” implies “simpler and easier to crank them out.”

But **(E)** neither solves nor deepens the mystery of the skewed distribution, because a comparison of kinds of Magdalenian lamps to those of other cultures doesn’t speak to the issue at hand, namely the number of lamps in the Upper Paleolithic period vs. the very different number in earlier years. To put it another way, the stimulus paradox deals with numbers, while **(E)** deals with variety or sameness of lamps. Since **(E)** is outside the scope, it’s an odd-man-out and is the correct answer.

24. (B)

If a question would “help to evaluate” an argument, that means that one answer would weaken the argument while another would strengthen it.

The conclusion (sentence 1) is that “a great number of” readers were influenced by *1984*, because Orwell’s novel came in second, after the Bible, in a survey. What could be a clearer confusion of number and percentage than this? If the Bible was cited by—say—999 out of 1,000 readers as their most influential book, the one remaining reader who cited *1984* would hardly qualify as “a great number.” The claim can only be assessed if we know more about the numbers in the survey, and that’s **(B)**.

The survey, and the conclusion, deal with the *influence* of books, so whether those surveyed read a great many books or few **(A)**, and whether or not they actually read the books they claim to have been influenced by **(E)**, are outside the scope. Even less relevant is the readership of the column **(C)**. Of the wrong choices perhaps **(D)** was most tempting, but the

number of *books* on the list is less important than the number of readers per book—which is **(B)**’s domain.

25. (C)

An issue that the author fails to take into account must be relevant to the author’s scope.

“Thus” signals the conclusion: Society is burdened by people’s voluntary choice not to exercise. The evidence is the greater cost to society of almost \$2,000 additional per sedentary—i.e. not exercising, not active—citizen. The evidence, however, never brings up the “voluntary” nature of sedentary living, and therein lies the argument’s flaw. If **(C)** is true, then in fact the cause-and-effect to which the author points is reversed. It’s not that sitting around raises the cost to society; it’s that the illnesses require one to sit around; the lack of exercise is hardly voluntary, and the costs are run up by the greater costs of care.

Any choice, like **(A)**, that accuses people of voluntarily failing to exercise tends to strengthen this argument rather than weakening it. **(B)** seems to cast blame on doctors for not discussing exercise with patients, but that’s hardly a compelling argument for letting sedentary people off the hook. **(D)** deals with those who **do** exercise and **(E)** with the benefits they enjoy—but they’re not the author’s target.

26. (E)

Arguments that state that a phenomenon is “clearly” the case are assuming that other alternatives don’t apply.

The conclusion doesn’t assert a reason Vermeer worked only a few familiar (and expensive) props into his paintings; it asserts why he *didn’t*. It *wasn’t*, the author argues, because of a lack of props. After all, if he was forced out of economic necessity to use the same small number of items again and again, why would the props be costly?—you’d expect him to keep reusing cheap ones. This whole argument hinges on the impossibility of Vermeer’s using expensive props if he only owned a few of them, and that’s **(E)**, which has to be true if the argument is to hold water.

Whether Vermeer bought, borrowed **(A)**, or stole the props is of no interest, nor is their availability **(B)**, constant or occasional, or their ownership by some second party **(C)**. What matters is why he used so few of them, and why the ones he did use were so costly. And since any number of props could hold sentimental value for an artist, the sheer existence of sentimental value **(D)** does not lend any insight into the central issue of whether Vermeer used only a few props because they’re the only ones he had.

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J. And if we select M, we must select J. Either way, we'd select three appliance designs, so we can select neither H nor M. Having rejected H, we must also reject v, which in turn means we must select both t and w. So there are two possibilities: LKtw and LJtw. (B) has it right.

5. (C) Rule removed/Could be true

When a rule is removed, you must start from scratch.

For this one question, part of Rule 1 doesn't apply. Selecting H still requires us to select w, but now we can have H without J. On to the choices:

(A) and (B) have the same problem. If we select M, we must select J, and so these two choices force us to select three appliance designs.

(C), however, is possible. Selecting v means we must select H and therefore w. Now that we can select H without selecting J, HKvw is an acceptable arrangement and so (C) is correct.

For the record: (D) Selecting v means we must select H, selecting M means we must select J, and we have three appliance designs again. (E) Selecting v means we must select H, which means we must select w, and now we have three cabinet designs, and so (E) doesn't work, either.

Game 2: "Summer Festival"

Situation: a town's summer festival. **Entities:** eight events. **Action:** to schedule (sequence) the eight events over three days. **Limitations:** there are three days, with three available time periods in each – eight events, nine possible slots, one slot will be left empty.

Let's begin by setting up a basic calendar of the summer festival's time slots:

	Fri	Sat	Sun
morn.			
aft.			
eve.			

BCDFOPRS

Rule 1: First up is a standard Sequencing rule. S is after P, so we'll have P . . . S somewhere. Be careful not to get rules like this backwards!

Rule 2: R is in the morning. We can build this into the sketch directly. For example, we can place an R in the "Morn." row.

Rule 3: is a concrete rule. We can now place F definitively.

Rule 4: B is in the evening, and before P. So B can't possibly be on Sunday evening, since that would leave no room for P. But wait! Given that F is on Saturday evening, the only available evening is Friday evening. So B is on Friday evening. You could have made this deduction here, and you could have made it at Step 4, but if you didn't see it at all, this was probably a very long game.

Rule 5: places D on either Saturday or Sunday. This one too can be built in directly, with arrows pointing to both valid days.

Rule 6: Careful! This doesn't mean that C is on Friday morning, since the first time period could be blank. But nothing is before C.

To answer the questions in time, you really needed to make the most of this setup. The big deduction concerns B. As we indicated above, the only evening that allows B to precede P is Friday evening, so *B is on Friday evening*. We can also make a deduction concerning R. R is in the morning (Rule 2) but cannot be the first event (Rule 6). So *R is on either Saturday morning or Sunday morning*. Note also that while B

and C are on Friday, every remaining event other than O is on Saturday or Sunday. So if the empty slot's not on Friday, then O must join B and C on that day. Not a great breakthrough, but something that's probably worth noticing.

	Fri	Sat	Sun
morn.	C?	R?	R?
aft.	C?		
eve.	B	F	

P ... S D

6. (C) Must be true

Copy your Master Sketch, build in the new information, and drive your data to the definite.

With the empty slot on Sunday, C, O, and B are the only events that can go on Friday. So C is in the morning, (Rule 6), B is in the evening, and O is in the afternoon. (C) is correct.

7. (C) Complete and Accurate List

You can make short work of "complete and accurate" questions if you use work from other questions.

This question is surely worth postponing, since we're likely to find possible scenarios in other questions that will help us eliminate wrong choices. In question 6 and in question 8, R is on Saturday morning, so (A) and (B), which don't include R, must be wrong. In question 9, D could be on Saturday morning, so (E), which doesn't include D, must be wrong. That leaves (C) and (D), and the only thing that distinguishes them is that (D) includes S. Could S be on Saturday morning? No way, since that would force P before B, in violation of Rule 4. So (C) is correct.

8. (D) Disguised must be true

Question stems do not have to contain the words "must be true" to test what must happen under given circumstances.

If S is on Sunday morning, then the only morning available for R is Saturday morning. Now we have to place P before S but after B. The only available slot is: Saturday afternoon! That's (D).

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9. (A) Must be true

Making the abstract concrete helps you find deductions and helps you answer the questions.

If R and S are on the same day, which day could that be? Neither one can go on Friday, but how about Saturday? No way. If R and S join F on Saturday, we'll have no room for P. So R and S are on Sunday, with R in the morning (Rule 2). That's all we know for sure going into the choices:

(A) must be true, so it's correct. F is on Saturday evening, and R is on Sunday morning. For the record:
 (B): C and O could occupy the first two slots, leaving no event between them, so (B) need not be true. (C), (D), and (E): The following acceptable arrangement proves that C and O need not be on the same day (C), D need not be on Sunday afternoon, (D), and P need not be on Saturday afternoon, (E).

10. (B) Must be true

Keep making deductions as long as they are coming to you; but when you don't see what else you can deduce, check the choices.

Here's another abstract question stem that you must translate. If S is on the day before D, and we know that S is on either Saturday or Sunday, then S must be on Saturday and D must be on Sunday. On to the second part of the stem: S and D are at the same time of day. What time is that? It can't be evening, since F is on Saturday evening. It can't be morning either, since R is on either Saturday or Sunday morning. So S and D must be on Saturday and Sunday afternoons, respectively. Now the only place for P is Saturday morning, and the only place for R is on Sunday morning. On to the choices:

(A) is impossible. The events on Saturday are P, S, and F. (B) must be true, since F is on Saturday evening and R is on Sunday morning. For the record:

(C), (E) O could be on Friday (C), but O could be on Sunday, too, which would place it after S, so (E) need not be true, either. (D) is impossible. P is on Saturday morning.

11. (C) Disguised must be true/number of possibilities

Translate question stems just as aggressively as you translate rules. Sometimes, the hard part about a question is determining what it's asking.

Two events are between C and S. Well, P must be before S (Rule 1) and so if S were on Sunday, then at least three events would come between C and S—B, P, and F. So P and S must both be on Saturday, P in the morning and S in the afternoon. Now what happens? Well, the empty time slot must be on Friday, since C must be the first event and we can't have anything breaking up our C-B-P-S combination, lest we violate the mandate in the stem. P on Saturday morning places R on Sunday morning, leaving O and D to float between the afternoon and evening slots on Sunday. Here's what we have so far:

	Fri	Sat	Sun
morn.	C/empty	P	R
aft.	C/empty		O/D
eve.	B	F	O/D

So what *don't* we know? O and D split the last two slots, but we can't tell their order. We also can't place C definitively. C could be either first or second, depending on where the empty slot goes. So five events can be precisely determined, choice (C).

12. (A) Partial acceptability/All EXCEPT

When the last question in a game is a really tough one, don't be afraid to move on to the next game and its questions.

There's really no reason to attempt this kind of question now; it's pretty time-consuming, even though the correct answer is (A). This may be a good one to come back to if time permits. For the sake of continuity, however, let's work through it here. The correct answer will be the choice that couldn't be the list of events on Sunday, but there's no obvious rule violation. So the correct answer will force a violation on another day. On to the choices:

(A) As it happens, the violator is the first choice. Placing the empty slot, S, and O on Sunday forces R, P, and D onto Saturday, but F is already on Saturday, so there isn't room for all of them. (A) is the winner. There's *really* no reason to look at the other choices, but for the record:

(B) The only available morning slot for R is on Saturday, the only available post-Friday slot for D is Saturday afternoon, and C and O occupy the first two slots. That's OK, so (B) is wrong. (C) would force P and S into the first two slots on Saturday, with C and O in the first two slots on Friday. That's OK. (D) leaves us more acceptable options. P and O can split the first two slots on Saturday, and C goes on Friday with the empty slot, in either order. There are a few more acceptable arrangements here, but you only need to find one to disprove (D). (E) Again, the only available morning slot for R is on Saturday, the only available post-Friday slot for P is Saturday afternoon, and C and the empty time period occupy the first two slots. That's OK, so (E) is wrong.


PrepTest 36 Explained

Game 3: "Sled Dogs"

Situation: a team of sled dogs. **Entities:** five sled dogs. **Action:** to keep track of the positions of the sled dogs (a sequencing game with a spatial element). **Limitations:** 5 dogs, 5 numbered positions, one dog per position.

When the testmaker gives you a picture, use it! The picture provided is a good framework for organizing your work. Add a list of entities, and you're set.

G H J K L



Rule 1 just defines "adjacency." This is pretty intuitive: sled dogs that are connected to the same harness are adjacent.

Rule 2 brings in a new distinction: experienced and inexperienced. So now the game has become a bit more complicated. We can keep track of the experienced/inexperienced distinction by making a note under our list of entities. "2 XP / 3 non-XP" is one way to do this.

Rule 3: Here's one we can build in directly. We can fill in an "XP" to remind us that the dog in position 1 is experienced.


Rules 4 and 5 can also be built in directly, by adding an "XP" to J and a "non-XP" to G.

Rule 6 is straightforward enough. The two experienced dogs cannot be adjacent. "No XP adjacent" is one way to represent this.

Rule 7 is similar to Rule 6: K and L aren't adjacent. "No KL adjacent" will do.

Since the experienced dogs aren't adjacent, and since an experienced dog is in position 1, *positions 2 and 3 are occupied by inexperienced dogs*. Therefore, J's assignment is limited. J is experienced, and so J can't be in either 2 or 3, and so *J must be in 1, 4, or 5*. Also, we know that since G is inexperienced, *G can't be in position 1*. That's plenty heading into the questions.

G(non-XP) H J(XP) K L
2 XP, 3 non-XP



No XP adjacent
No KL adjacent

13. (C) Acceptability

Use the rules to toss out the violators.


This question is a quick battle if you've done good work up front. We can't have an inexperienced dog in position 1, so (A) and (B) are wrong. Positions 2 and 3 must be occupied by inexperienced dogs, so (D), which omits the third position, and (E), which omits the second position, must be wrong. (C) is the only choice that remains, and yes, positions 2, 3, and 4 could all have inexperienced dogs.

14. (E) Must be true

As long as the deductions are coming to you, keep making them. But as soon as you're stuck, consult the choices.

With J in 5, we have the experienced/inexperienced breakdown set. J is experienced, and position 1 has an experienced dog, and so positions 2, 3, and 4 must all have inexperienced dogs. The rest of the setup is pretty wide open, but (E) is inferable. Position 4 has an inexperienced dog, and so (E) is correct.

(A), (B), and (C) are all eliminated by this scenario:




(D) is impossible. As we deduced above, position 3 is always occupied by an inexperienced dog.

Section II: Logic Games

15. (D) Must be false

If the correct answer “must be false,” the four wrong answers are either possible or true.

With L and H in 4th and 5th, J is forced into position 1, since otherwise J would be adjacent to an experienced dog in 1. That leaves G and K to be placed, but we know that K and L can't be adjacent, and so K must be in 3 and G must be in 2.



So all the choices must be true except (D). G and H aren't adjacent.

16. (A) What information guarantees a result

Don't be afraid to postpone work on a tough question. Sometimes, a game that isn't that tough contains a difficult question or two.

If K is in 5, what would guarantee that an experienced dog is in 4? From here, trying the choices is just as fast as anything else, and luckily, we don't have far to search. We have to separate K and L, so if G were in 2, then L would have to go in 1. That means J must go in 4, and so (A), if true would guarantee that an experienced dog (i.e., Jinook) would be in 4.

(B), (C), (D), and (E) If J were first, L were second, and either G or H were third, then the other of the G/H pair must be fourth. Either way, K could be an experienced dog, and since we have only 2 experienced dogs (and one is first), all these choices fail to guarantee that the dog in position 4 is experienced.

17. (A) Must be true

If a question boils down to two distinct scenarios, work out both scenarios and you'll know what must, could, and cannot be true.

If J is next to K and L, where could J be? J can't be first, since that would place K and L in 2 and 3, next to each other. So J must be in either 4 or 5. If J is in 4, then K and L occupy the only positions adjacent to J: positions 2 and 5. That leaves G and H to place. G can't be in 1 (Rules 3 and 5), so G would go in 3, and H would go in 1. If J is in 5, we get much the same story: K and L split positions 3 and 4, G still can't go in 1 and so must go in 2, and H again goes in 1. So either way, Hira is adjacent to G, and (A) is correct.

(B) is impossible, since H is in 1 and J is in either 4 or 5. (C) and (D) both could be true, but need not be true—both K and L could be in either 4 or 5. (E) also need not be true, since J and L could occupy positions 4 and 5.

PrepTest 36 Explained

Game 4: "Animal Examinations"

Situation: veterinarian's office. **Entities:** seven animals to be examined. **Action:** to put the animals' examinations in order. **Limitations:** 7 animals, 7 examinations, 1 animal per examination.

Seven slots representing the seven exams, plus a list of entities, will do just fine:

P Q R S T V W

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Rule 1: P is right before T. "PT" will do.


Rules 2 and 3: These rules are in if/then form, which means that we should determine their contrapositives, too. Since Q 5th means that V is 6th, we also know that if V isn't 6th, Q cannot be 5th. Similarly, since S 2nd means that P is 3rd, we also know that if P isn't 3rd, then S isn't 2nd.

Rule 4 is easy enough to build in directly, with arrows pointing to both the 4th and 6th positions.

Rule 5 can also be built in directly. "No V" in the 1st and 5th positions will do.

This set-up stays pretty wide open. There aren't major blocs of entities, the rules aren't too concrete, and lots of stuff is possible. A little time spent here wasn't wasted, but in general, simple sequencing games tend not to have Big Deductions that fill in large chunks of the picture.

P Q R S T V W



PT

If Q = 5th → V = 6th

If V ≠ 6th → Q ≠ 5th

If S = 2nd → P = 3rd

If P ≠ 3rd → S ≠ 2nd

18. (B) Acceptability

Use the rules to eliminate the violators.

The question set begins with the usual acceptability question, so we can use the familiar Kaplan strategy of using the rules to eliminate choices. Rule 1 is violated by no choice, but Rule 2 is violated by (E) which has Q fifth without V sixth. Rule 3 kills (C), which has S second without P third. Rule 4 axes (D), which has W fifth. Finally, Rule 5 eliminates (A), which has V fifth. (B) remains and is correct.

19. (C) Must be true

When the stem provides concrete information in an "if clause," build the new information into a little picture and see where the new information takes you.

If S is second, then P is third (Rule 3), and thus T must be fourth (Rule 1). Since W isn't fourth, W must be sixth (Rule 4). Now who could be fifth? V is never fifth (Rule 5), and since V cannot be sixth, Q cannot be fifth either. So R is the only animal that can be fifth, and so (C) is correct.

20. (C) Must be true

When you're able to definitely place a number of entities, ask yourself "who's left?"

If Q is fifth then V is sixth (Rule 2). Since W isn't sixth, W must be fourth (Rule 4). Only slots 1, 2, 3, and 7 are open, and so the PT pair will have to go either first and second or second and third. Joining them in the first three slots is R (as the stem indicates) and so the only entity that could be seventh is S. So (C) must be true.

(A), (B) and (D) could be true, but R could be first, placing P second and T third. (E) is impossible. W is fourth here.

21. (D) Complete and accurate list

Use the choices to help you answer "complete and accurate" questions more efficiently. Look to eliminate several choices at once, and never check entities that appear in all the remaining choices.

If P is third, T is fourth (Rule 1), and so W is sixth. Since V isn't sixth, Q isn't fifth, and we can eliminate (A), (C), and (E). The only difference between (B) and (D) is that (D) includes R. Could R be fifth? Sure. SVPTRWQ is one such acceptable arrangement. So R belongs on our list, and (D) is correct.

22. (C) Must be true

When you're working with a bloc of entities, see where it could go. You may be surprised to see that it can only go in one place.

If W is right after Q, where could they be? W cannot be sixth, since that would place Q fifth which in turn would force V to be sixth. So W must be fourth, and Q must be third. Now where can we place the VS pair mandated by the stem? Placing them first and second would violate Rule 3, and V can never be fifth (Rule 5), so V and S must be sixth and seventh, respectively. Now the only place for the PT pair is first and second, and so R, the only animal left, must be fifth, the only space left. (C) is correct.

23. (D) Number of possibilities

Sometimes the testmaker makes an easy game more difficult by asking tough questions.

If P, T and V all are examined after W, then W must be fourth and not sixth. V can never be fifth (Rule 5), and if we placed V sixth we'd have to break up the PT pair. So V is seventh and P and T are fifth and sixth, respectively. Now we have to work out the possibilities for the first three slots. The only restriction that applies comes via Rule 3. We know that S cannot be second because we know P cannot be third. If S is first, then the arrangement is either SQRWPTV or SRQWPTV. If S is third, the arrangement is either QRSWPTV or RQSWPTV. So 4 combinations are possible.

24. (B) Could be true

If no deductions strike you immediately, move to the choices.

If R is fourth, then W is sixth, but not much follows immediately from there. On to the choices:

(A): P can't be third, since that would force T into the fourth position, and the stem places R fourth. So (A) is impossible.

(B), however, could be true. If Q is first we could place P and T second and third, respectively. S could be fifth, and V seventh, and presto! QPTRSWV is an acceptable arrangement. So (B) could be true and is therefore correct. For the record:

(C): If S is second we have no place for our PT pair.

(D): If S is seventh, then who could be fifth? Not P or T, since they have to be together. Not Q, since V isn't sixth. Not V (Rule 5). So if S is seventh, then no one could be fifth, and so (D) is impossible. Technically, we could have deduced that S must be fifth before we consulted the choices, but that deduction was pretty subtle, so there's nothing wrong with discovering it here.

(E) is impossible since P immediately precedes T, and we already know that W is sixth.

PrepTest 36 Explained

SECTION III: READING COMPREHENSION

Passage 1: “Computer Conferences = Communities?”

Questions 1–6

The **Topic** is computer conferences, and the **Scope** is clarified in the question raised by ¶ 1. Do, as advocates claim (lines 11–16), computer conferences qualify as genuine alternatives to the traditional community? ¶ 1 begins by defining the characteristics of the traditional community (lines 1–4), and then details the technological changes that have led to the decline of the traditional community (lines 4–10) and the forming of computer conferences. At the end of ¶ 2 you have to figure that the author’s **Purpose** is either going to be to take a pro or con stand on the question, or merely to explain it without asserting a view.

Structurally, ¶ 2 and ¶ 3 are interestingly parallel. Each presents a pair of arguments for a position, a brief first opinion (lines 19–22 vs. lines 44–47) and then a second, lengthier, clearly more important argument. ¶ 2 is the advocates’ position. To them, the common topics of computer conferences (lines 19–22) is clearly less persuasive than are the elaborate conventions, lines 22–41, that create an essential support system for conference participants, one that is not unlike the traditional community as described in ¶ 1. Meanwhile, that “But” in line 42 in and of itself signals the author’s overall **Purpose**: to rebut the advocates’ argument. He accomplishes it in ¶ 3. To the author, the limiting need for computer literacy (lines 44–47) takes a back seat to the real issue (lines 47–59): Computer conferences are self-selecting groups lacking the “nonintentionality” and “genuine diversity” of the traditional community. The author ends by urging conference participants to get out of the house.

1. (D)

When a passage asserts a strong author point of view, be ruthless in rejecting those choices that fall short of expressing it.

(D) serves to sum up the author’s dissenting view of the viability of the computer-conference “community.” And (D) gains strength by acknowledging, as the author does, that his opponents have a point.

(A) is a 180, the confident phrase “can substitute effectively” summing up the view with which our author

emphatically takes issue. (B) is a state of affairs the author would like to see happen—computer users interacting with their real-life neighbors—but he only recommends doing so and actually sounds forlorn rather than optimistic. (C) is a point that the author *concedes* to his opponents in lines 42–43, that yes, computer conferences can be respectful and supportive. And (E) goes a dangerous step beyond the author’s views as asserted here, by suggesting that even if his main objections (limited computer access and lack of diversity) were met, he still wouldn’t be satisfied, would still say that computer conferences are “unacceptable substitutes.” One cannot put words into an author’s mouth that way.

2. (C)

Characterize the 4 wrong / 1 right choices in every all EXCEPT question.

The four wrong choices all demonstrate elements that are a part of the author’s definition of community: shared interest (line 49)—note that the four wrong ones all use the words “the same”—as well as “genuine diversity” (lines 55–59). But in (C), there’s a sameness of interest with little diversity. Indeed, (C) could have been written as a clear illustration of conferences as described in lines 53–55.

3. (E)

Study the context of any phrase quoted in a question stem.

The context of the phrase in question is “But while it is true that...” We have just heard, at the end of ¶ 2, that computer conferences use polite etiquette and involve personal support. “But while it is true that...” is the author’s way of saying “I concede that there is something communal in a computer conference,” and that’s (E). Remember that “mutual respect and emotional support” were cited back at line 4 as elements of traditional community.

Since the author believes that conferences do “discriminate along educational or economic lines,” he’d have no interest in “countering” that claim (A). The “argument that” computer conferences amount to “a form of social etiquette” (B) has already been introduced—in ¶ 2—by the time line 42 rolls around. Besides having nothing to do with the line reference at hand, (C) is a 180 in that the overall purpose is to make, not to counter, the claim that computer conferences aren’t really communities. (D) is a 180 in a different way: By acknowledging that “respect and support” are community-like qualities that computer

Section III: Reading Comprehension

conferences do share, the author certainly isn't trying to point out *differences* in respect.

4. (E)

The ultimate guide to an answer's location has to be the question's thrust, not a mere line reference.

The stem cites line 15, but since the "refutation of the claim" doesn't occur until ¶ 3, that's where we must go. As we said before, ultimately the conference-as-community argument fails because computer conferences lack the kind of "genuine diversity" (line 58) that tie people together in "a sense of interdependence" (a phrase from line 4 that's echoed in ¶ 3). **(E)** correctly cites that diversity as a necessary condition of community.

(A) can't be "refuting" the claim of conference-as-community, because **(A)** sums up why advocates make that claim in the first place (lines 36–41). The adoption of etiquette conventions **(B)** is a characteristic of computer conferences that make them more respectful and supportive, but the author never asserts that, for instance, actual neighbors living next door have to have such etiquette conventions. They already *are* a community, because they live nearby and have mutual interests. **(C)** is tricky. Proximity is listed in ¶ 1 as an aspect of "traditional communities." But the question has to do with how the author refutes a claim, and the two necessary conditions of community in that refutation are a lack of discrimination (lines 44–47) and the presence of diversity (lines 47–59), and **(C)** mentions none of that. **(D)** is easier to reject, since it's a 180; diversity, not sameness, is what characterizes community.

5. (C)

Use your Roadmap when you're asked about the purpose of a paragraph.

As we saw originally, ¶ 2 sums up the argument of the conference-as-community crowd **(C)**.

By the time ¶ 2 rolls around we're far beyond how computer conferences began **(A)**. **(B)** describes the purpose of ¶ 3, not ¶ 2. **(D)** would be more correct if it read "to introduce an *argument* that will be *countered* in....," and **(E)** would better read "to the *characterization* of computer conferences *rebutted* in...."

6. (B)

A Reading Comprehension "argument weakener" works much the same way as a weakener in LR, except

you have to identify which argument the question is talking about.

Two arguments are made in ¶ 3, and the first (computer conferences aren't communities because they "discriminate") is easier to weaken because it gets a slighter treatment. If **(B)** is true and computers are more "affordable and accessible," then that is reason to argue that, today, there's less discrimination "along educational and economic lines."

Greater acceptance of diversity **(A)** isn't the same as greater diversity, and the latter is what the author argues is required of a true community. **(C)** is a distortion; the author isn't arguing in ¶ 3 that today's communities aren't civil and supportive enough (though he does imply, in ¶ 1, that fewer people participate in communities than they did years ago). The comfort level of people in communities **(D)** doesn't come under the author's radar; if anything, the author would seem to favor sacrificing the comfort of anonymity in favor of some risky, face-to-face contact. In the same way, **(E)** suggests that computer conferences are more efficient than true communities, but efficient communication is not the characteristic about which the author is so nostalgic.

PrepTest 36 Explained

Passage 2: “English Renaissance Latin”

Questions 7–14

The **Topic** is Latin writing during the English Renaissance, and the **Scope** is its underappreciated importance to that period. To explain that lack of appreciation is the author’s **Purpose**, and the explanation is the **Main Idea**: For various reasons, scholars have failed to pick up on the importance of Latin. OK. Now let’s chart how the author gets to all of that.

¶ 1 begins by touting Latin writing as the expression of the highest form of English thought during the Renaissance. Starting with “However” (line 11), the author shifts gears to his real complaint—or rather, his complaint as articulated by Binns; this is a “book review” passage in which our reviewer is 100% behind Binns’s views.

Scholars simply don’t appreciate the depth, breadth, and importance of English writing in Latin. Why not? Each ¶ indicts a different group of scholars. ¶ 1 explains that because “academic specializations don’t overlap,” Latin classicists stick to “humanistic and literary writings,” and leave the truly great scientific and theological stuff to scholars who can’t read the Latin! ¶ 2 explores the deficiencies of intellectual historians—the ones who do study theology and science, but who concentrate on translations from the Latin and fail to appreciate Latin’s true nuances and influences back in the 1500’s–1600’s.

¶ 3 somewhat validates ¶ 1’s classicists (they’re not trained to deal with scientific issues) and ¶ 2’s intellectual historians (they can’t read the Latin), but still complains that each side has contributed to a distorted view of Renaissance England.

7. (E)

Wrong answers in Global questions typically focus on details.

(E) is the only choice that expresses the topic, scope, purpose, and main idea of the passage. It indicts the academics, reflects the importance of Latin writing, and laments how little that writing is understood.

(A) ignores Latin writing altogether, and blows up the relatively minor distinction between humanistic and scientific/theological writings into the main point. (B) gives far too much significance to the litany of English writers mentioned in sentence 1; they’re just there (as we’ll discuss with regard to question 10) as illustration. Ancient Roman texts (C) are even further removed from this passage; both (B) and (C) seem to

be there to tempt readers who only got as far as line 7 and then stopped. (D) is a distortion. Both types of scholars mentioned in (D) have analyzed some Latin writings in depth (if sometimes in translation) and ignored others.

8. (B)

Check all possible locations of the correct answer before you predict or evaluate the choices.

The scope of the question is broad enough to encompass either ¶ 1 or ¶ 2, and happily there’s support for correct answer (B) in both places. Again and again the author asserts that “philological training” (line 22) is needed, and that scholars “underestimate” (line 35) and “ignore” (line 37) the influence of Latin on Renaissance culture. Those are the two necessary conditions to which (B) refers.

(A) distorts the scholars’ Latin weaknesses into a broader “lack of training,” and treats their reliance on English translation as a result (of scholars’ deficiency) rather than as a cause (of their misunderstanding of Latin’s importance). (C) is a 180: The scholars studying literature are actually quite capable of understanding that Latin (lines 14–18). (D) is a 180 of a different sort, accusing legal and scientific texts of getting too much attention rather than too little. (E) is completely wrong, since the trio of writers “all...wrote in English” (line 4).

9. (D)

When proper names appear in a question stem, use them as clues to locate the answer in the text.

The word “Continent”—essential to the English/Continental comparison that is the topic of the question—appears twice in ¶ 2. First we’re told that scholars now “underestim[ate] the influence on English writers of their counterparts on the European Continent” (lines 35–37). Subsequently we learn something of that influence: “many Latin works by Continental humanists that were not translated at the time...became the bases of classic English works...” (lines 46–49). These two facts are summarized in each of (D)’s clauses, respectively.

No evidence of the frequency of Latin writing on the Continent is provided, let alone a comparison with England’s Latin writing (A). The communion between Continental writers and *audiences*, whether English or otherwise, is never brought up (B). (C) is a 180 in its assertion that the two groups’ concerns were fundamentally different, and a distortion in that it credits Latin as the sole means of communication

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(even line 46 implies that the writers knew Greek as well). **(E)** is a 180 for sure, in that the author sees a modern *underemphasis* in the appreciation of English and Continental intellectual ties.

10. (D)

When asked for the purpose of a detail, consider its context.

The three, “all of whom wrote in English” (line 4), appear merely so that Binns and the author can use the assertion that they “do not alone represent the high culture of Renaissance England” as an introduction to the Latin writers. **(D)** reaffirms that limited purpose.

No distinction between the three writers’ prose works **(A)** is ever made. The author’s goal is not to debunk the influence of Shakespeare et al., as **(B)** would have it, but simply to assert that these writers-in-English don’t represent the sum of contemporary culture. **(D)** is a detail from late in ¶ 2 (lines 3–35) having nothing to do with the purpose of the list of authors early in ¶ 1. And since those writers wrote in English, **(E)** is a demonstrable 180.

11. (C)

“Hot Words” are evocative passage text that is repeated in the question stem and that can help you find your way.

The words “Binns” and “English-language writings of Renaissance England” appear verbatim in lines 33–35, and they’re your clue to the location of the right answer. **(C)** just repeats the subsequent charge (lines 35–37) that intellectual scholars have approached such writing as a coherent whole, when in fact such an approach is far from coherent or whole because it fails to consider the influential writing in Latin.

The subject matter **(A)** of the English-language writings is relevant to the interest of specialists (literary critics have read literature, science historians have read science) but not to how the writings have been “valued.” Specialists wouldn’t assert that writing in English wasn’t influential **(B)**, just that it doesn’t tell the whole story. **(D)** distorts the subsequent (line 37) reference to Continental writers, who are there as an influence on English writers, not as a group to be compared with them. If anything, contrary to **(E)**, it sounds as if Binns would want to have English and Latin writing studied together, the better to formulate a truly “autonomous and coherent whole.”

12. (C)

Study the stem carefully for clues as to the answer’s location.

“Late-Renaissance scientific works written in Latin” are Hot Words directing you to line 52. The entire sentence (lines 50–55) asserts that late Renaissance science is “difficult” and that scholars lack training to deal with it. That’s **(C)**.

“Easier” **(A)**? Hardly. No “illuminating commentaries” **(B)** on scientific writing are alluded to. Lines 42–46 suggest that the core of contemporary English university study was the literature and the humanities, not science **(D)**. 3As for **(E)**, the context of the entire sentence in lines 50–55 suggests that these writers were in fact English rather than Continental.

13. (E)

Context is (virtually) everything in Purpose questions.

The contrast between Milton and Newton in lines 22–27 comes at the end of a subsection that begins at line 17. The idea is that scholars of Latin have done tons of analysis of literary figures (like Milton) but woefully at sea when dealing with a man of science (like Newton). The gist of all that comes in **(E)**.

(A)’s suggestion that the two men illustrate a “range” ignores the sharp contrast in the structure of lines 22–27; in fact, it’s the passage *as a whole* that “illustrate[s] the range” of Renaissance Latin writing. Scholarly “attitudes” **(B)** are nowhere alluded to in the passage at all, let alone lines 22–27. You don’t have to know from your general knowledge that Milton and Newton were both Englishmen to recognize that an England vs. Continent comparison **(C)** is not alluded to at this point in the text. **(D)** offers an incorrect contrast between the men, and also seems to think that Newton was a literary writer when the passage makes clear he was a scientist.

14. (D)

Global questions ought to be attacked early on, whether they’re at the beginning, middle, or end of the question set.

“Gone unexamined” (line 14), “underestimating” (line 35), “each side’s inability to cross boundaries...each presents a distorted reading” (lines 55–57)—throughout the passage the author demonstrates his interest in explaining why scholars have been “deficient” in assessing Latin writing from the English Renaissance, and the consequences of that deficiency. **(D)** sums up the purpose neatly.



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No “approaches,” new or otherwise, are “enumerated” **(A)** here; if anything, the author would like to see a new approach adopted. No theories **(B)** are presented; what Binns has to offer is a value judgment on some written work, not a theory. No dispute **(C)** is mentioned; the passage is just a summary of what scholars have failed to do. And our author is here to affirm Binns, not to “correct” him **(E)**.



Section III: Reading Comprehension

Passage 3: “Hormones’ Influence on Behavior”

Questions 15–18

The author begins by acknowledging that which has been known: Certain hormones influence both reproduction (= biology; physiology) and sexuality (= behavior). Hormones are thus introduced as the **Topic**. The **Scope**, their dual influence, is reinforced when we learn that the influence of “other hormones” on behavior “has now become clear.” That’s perhaps the last thing to become clear in the entire passage, which goes into extraordinarily technical and dismal detail to live up to the author’s **Purpose** as laid out in lines 9–13: explaining how it is that hormones don’t just influence the balance of body fluids (= physiology), but also influence how much water and salt we consume (= behavior).

The author drops the discussion of hormones from line 13 until line 34. In between, he defines homeostasis as “balance” and narrows the discussion to the homeostasis of body fluids. We need to understand that “osmolality” refers to the concentration of solutes in plasma, and the gist of it all is that osmolality has to be kept “within relatively narrow ranges” through the balancing of water and salt. Minor fluctuations of solutes are OK (lines 26–32), but when solute levels are too high or too low, that’s when hormones “come into play.”

Lines 36–58 explain the process. The hormone vasopressin causes the kidneys to retain water. When osmolality is low, the inhibiting of vasopressin leads the body to get rid of extra water and, not surprisingly, reduces thirst. (If the body’s trying to get rid of water, greater thirst would put it at cross purposes by causing more water consumption.) Did you welcome the Keyword “Conversely” in line 44? It helps, doesn’t it? When osmolality *increases*, *more* vasopressin is secreted, causing the reverse process: Water is conserved, and a person gets thirsty. There’s more, but it’s not central to that principal contrast, which is designed to show how at least one hormone—vasopressin—affects both the physiology of plasma and the behavior of the human being. There’s your **Main Idea** in a nutshell.

15. (D)

Properly identifying topic and scope is always crucial, especially in a dense and difficult passage.

(D) has it all, the hormones, the plasma osmolality, and the simultaneous physiological and behavioral influence.

(A) cites a detail from lines 22–25, which is bad enough for a Global answer, but (A) also fails to realize that the bulk of the passage deals with what happens when osmolality goes *beyond* “narrow ranges.” (B) draws an unwarranted distinction between behavioral responses and physiological ones, and focuses too narrowly on dehydration. If (C) were the main idea the passage would have to be going backward in time, detailing the dearth of hormone knowledge in past years and explaining how hormones’ influence came to be discovered now. The role played in the passage by reproduction (E) is simply to illustrate the most commonly understood instance of hormones influencing both physiology and behavior. Once the author cranks up the discussion of plasma osmolality, reproduction is left behind.

16. (C)

Use Hot Words to focus your attention on the right part of the passage.

The only appearance of “gonadal hormones” is in the very first sentence, whose explanation of a specific hormonal influence connection to both biology and behavior opens the door to the broader issue in lines 6–9 and another specific, extended example. (C) properly characterizes the reference’s introductory nature, with (C)’s “research into” paraphrasing the passage’s “Discussions of.”

(A) formulates an irrelevant comparison between gonadal and peptide hormones, two separate entities as far as the passage is concerned. The connection between hormones and behavior is of intense interest to the author, contrary to (B); and he’s not “decriing” anything. That which is “commonly held” (D) is the idea that gonadal hormones influence sexual behavior. That’s accepted. The rest of the passage doesn’t so much “refute” that idea, as broaden it to include other types of human behavior. And the findings in lines 9–58 go beyond that which is known about gonadal hormones; the findings don’t double back to that topic as (E) would have it.

17. (B)

Don’t answer based on a hunch; go back and check the text.

Since vasopressin is inhibited or stimulated depending on whether osmolality is lower or higher, respectively,

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and since the whole process begins whenever homeostasis is threatened, **(B)** is readily inferable.

(A), **(C)**, and **(D)** all mention steroid hormones, which are only mentioned in passing back at line 9. Vasopressin is a peptide hormone (line 41), that we know; whether vasopressin also qualifies as a steroid, or works with a steroid, goes unmentioned in the text, so all three choices should be rejected promptly. **(E)** gets a key relationship backward, cf. lines 53-54: “thirst is stimulated only after vasopressin has been released...”

18. (A)

Rely on your sense of the passage *gestalt*.

Keeping topic, scope, purpose, and main idea in mind—tough to do with answer choices only 3 or 4 words long—we seek a choice that is fairly objective in tone and that points to that which “has now become clear.” Only **(A)** fits the bill.

No “questioning,” “reinterpreting,” or “advocating” is going on—that knocks out **(B)**, **(C)**, and **(D)**; and if **(E)** read “outline recent findings” it’d be swell, but no “approach” is outlined or even suggested.

19. (A)

Characterize the “odd man out” choice in all/EXCEPT questions before moving to the passage.

Since the four wrong choices all “typically occur” in osmolality homeostasis, we need a choice that either emphatically doesn’t occur, or that is outside the scope. The latter is more likely here, since a variety of opposing things can happen in homeostasis: Vasopressin can be secreted **(C)** or inhibited; thirst can be increased **(B)** or decreased; the person can excrete water **(D)** or consume sodium **(E)** depending on whether the osmolality is rising or falling. But hunger never enters into the process, at least insofar as the passage is concerned, so **(A)** is what we want.

20. (B)

Use Hot Words.

The Hot Words here are “withholding of vasopressin.” A quick skim of ¶ 2 indicates that it occurs in lines 37–44, when osmolality decreases. Vasopressin is inhibited, which leads to excretion of surplus water and to inhibited thirst. Which makes sense. The body is trying to get rid of excess water, and less thirst means less inducement to drink. So **(B)** correctly describes the process.

(A) is the opposite of what happens when vasopressin is inhibited or withheld. **(C)**, too, is a 180: Yes, **(C)**

describes the hormone’s normal role (lines 41–42), but when vasopressin is held back, the *opposite* of conservation occurs. Vasopressin doesn’t come into play, as far as we’re told, when “minor changes” **(D)** occur. And **(E)** drags in those steroid hormones again—a one-line reference (line 9) that appears in the passage largely to inspire a slew of wrong answers like this one.

Section III: Reading Comprehension

Passage 4: “South Africa’s Changing Legal System”

Questions 21–26

The **Topic** is introduced right away as the legal system in South Africa, which is changing—here’s the **Scope**—now that the system of government has changed from apartheid to constitutional democracy. ¶ 1 compares the old system (parliament made and administered the laws) to the new (the courts can trump parliament, and will acknowledge individual rights). The note of “uncertainty” (line 5) is picked up in ¶ 2, which details one of the big difficulties in the new system, the lack of precedent upon which to rely. ¶ 3 details the other difficulty, a need to change the people’s attitudes. Citizens used to being suspicious and fearful of the government are going to have to learn to see it as a useful tool to promote rights and justice.

21. (D)

Avoid choices in global questions that focus on detail.

The changes in the South African legal system—its opportunities and its obstacles—are neatly summarized in (D).

(A) implies that the new system has yet to be designed, which we know not to be the case. Acceptance is the issue now, but (B) distorts the acceptance significantly: The new legal system hinges on the people’s willingness to *believe* that they can challenge the powers that be (lines 53–57), not their eagerness to *exercise* those challenges. (C) is a detail that is part of the old vs. new comparison of ¶ 1 (see question 22, below); (C) falls short of summarizing the thrust of the overall passage. In the same vein, (E) harps on the precedent issue of ¶ 2, leaving out the broader issues as well as ¶ 3.

22. (C)

Your work on one question can help you with the others, if you keep your eyes open and make the right connections.

Analyzing wrong choice (C) in the previous question helps us select right answer (C) in the present instance. Lines 1–19, as we just saw, contrast the old legal system with the new.

Parliament will evidently continue to make the laws—that’s implied in line 17—but the entire thrust of lines 10–19 deals with the judiciary, not the legislature (A). Returning to an element of the old apartheid system in which the parliament arbitrarily interprets law (B) is

one of the *last* things our author would want to see happen. (D), too, is a 180, since a court with legal authority is clearly a step in the right direction toward justice. Meanwhile, the explanation for adding a bill of rights comes in lines 24–29 (E).

23. (D)

In an author’s attitude question, begin with whether s/he is positive or negative or neutral.

Clearly the author favors the kind of rights-based legal system he spends 57 lines describing, so he is not indifferent (C). Not only are there no signs of despair that would justify (A) or (B), but one has to wonder how the passage could possibly be written such that one of them would be credited and the other not! Since they’re functionally identical, they must both be wrong. (E) goes too far in the other direction: There are too many if’s, too many obstacles described to credit the author with 100% confidence. That leaves (D), and it echoes the “hopeful scholars” (line 40) whom the author approvingly cites; it is positive without being overly sunny.

24. (C)

Even as the section is ending and time may be tight, don’t cut corners; go back and check the text for support.

We return once again to the old vs. new comparison in lines 10–19. Lines 11–14 confirm that when parliament disagreed with judges, the former changed the laws (B).

There was no constitutional court under apartheid as far as we know from the passage (A), and citizen challenges (B) clearly weren’t part of that system either; both (A) and (B) are touted as elements of the new system under construction. Evidently there was no bill of rights (D) until recently, and since parliament trumped the judges, no “other” judges (E), “rule-bound” or not, could counteract the legislature.

25. (E)

When all five choices are written abstractly, make a careful pre-phrase or prediction to avoid getting bogged down in the terminology.

Our Roadmap reminds us that the overall purpose of ¶ 3 is to lay out the second of two major obstacles in the way of the new legal system. The ¶ starts by identifying the obstacle as the people’s view of their government (lines 44–45). It goes on to explain how their mindset affects the people’s behavior (lines 45–53), and ends by asserting a necessary condition (“If ...succeed, the

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government will need to show...”). Each of those pieces is expressed by **(E)**.

The ¶ certainly begins with a problem rather than a solution **(A)** and makes no discrimination between approaches later on. The “background” **(B)** doesn’t come until sentence 2, and **(B)** makes no criticism of past methods; indeed, most of ¶ 3 is written in the present tense. The last sentence is not so much an argument for a solution **(C)** as an assertion of that which is necessary for the new system to succeed. **(D)**’s last clause—“the problem is shown to exist no longer”—should have made you turn away from **(D)** in annoyance. The problem of citizen distrust of the government, however justified or understandable, remains.

26. (A)

“Would be...likely to agree” signals inference.

The scholars in question, lines 34–43, are “hopeful” that South Africa will not rush headlong to grab any old precedents from other countries’ legal systems—precedents that might work elsewhere but might not be applicable to South Africa. This would amount to the “misuse of foreign law” (line 36) that **(A)** discusses in some detail.

(B) blends the ¶ 2 issue of lack of precedent with the ¶ 3 issue of citizen mistrust to create an out-of-scope mess. The issue is not whether the bill of rights will be “interpret[ed] correctly” **(C)**, but whether the interpretations taken from other countries will be appropriate to South Africa’s citizens. **(D)** is too downbeat, ignoring the “scholars” who “are hopeful” that South African judges *will* be able to use foreign precedent selectively and wisely. And **(E)** denies the “need to look for other countries for guidance” (lines 33–34) that underlies South African judicial use of foreign precedent in the first place.

SECTION IV: LOGICAL REASONING

1. (D)

To “resolve an apparent discrepancy” means to add a fact that permits two other facts to coexist.

The author finds it paradoxical that while ingesting lead is dangerous to kids, *removing* lead apartment paint is even more so. That is only paradoxical if there’s nothing in the removal process that enhances the danger, but (D) points out an even more dangerous consequence of lead paint removal; so if (D) is true, the statements don’t contradict each other.

The scope of the argument is lead and its removal, not the replacement of lead paint with other paints (A) or the existence of other environmental hazards (E). The wisdom of allocating funds in one particular way (B) has nothing to do with the safety of lead and of paints removal. And no matter what the source (C) of the dangerous lead is, the greater danger of the paint removal remains puzzling.

2. (A)

A prediction can be weakened if you can alter the circumstances affecting its alleged cause-and-effect.

The author prophesies bad times for newspapers once more people can readily obtain faster and more efficient electronic data. That prediction can only hold true if one assumes that there’s nothing about newspapers per se that is likely to remain desirable in the wake of this electronic revolution. (A) weakens that assumption by presenting a feature of newspapers that electronic data cannot duplicate. If (A) is true the predicted dire fate of newspapers may still prove to be accurate, but not for the reason proposed.

As long as some service is affordable, the existence of differently-priced electronic data services (B) shouldn’t stand in the way of the eclipsing of the newspaper. Those who have never read newspapers anyway (C) are not part of the author’s calculus; she’s betting that it’s the other 70 percent who **have** relied on newspapers who will drift away. If the cost of electronic data will be roughly equivalent to the cost of newspapers, then that can only hasten the demise of the newspaper medium, so (D) strengthens the logic. (E) is pretty much a strengthener, too, since it renders negligible the cost of installation, a cost that might make a newspaper reader think twice about switching.

3. (C)

Use Logic Keywords to help you sort out evidence and conclusion.

“It follows that” is generally a reliable signal of an argument’s conclusion, and so it proves here. “X is a requirement for Y” is logically equivalent to “No one can Y without X,” and that makes (C) correct. X is “having a superior mastery of athletic techniques,” and Y is “an athlete’s becoming a champion.”

(A) reverses the conditions. Those with a superior mastery of athletic techniques have met a necessary condition for becoming a champ, not vice versa. The stimulus’s “Since” clause is repeated in (D), but “Since” signals evidence, not conclusion. And that “since” clause suggests that most top athletes have the same muscular strength—superior or otherwise—so becoming a champion must hinge on something else (B). (E) repeats the first sentence’s second clause, which is acting only as background to, or secondary evidence for, the argument. It’s certainly not the point to which the argument is proceeding.

4. (B)

When the right answer is a point at issue, the wrong choices are either points of agreement, or points outside the scope.

Mary declares that computers will render experts no longer essential to ordinary people, while Joyce predicts “a greater dependency” on experts. So to the proposition made by (B), Mary would say “No”, and Joyce would say “Yes.”

Neither woman brings up “knowledge dissemination” (A) or “dependency on computers” (D), so whether both would agree or disagree or part company, we have no idea. (C) is an area of agreement between them: Mary states it and Joyce seems to agree because she makes the parallel with “previous centuries.” As for (E), Mary certainly thinks that (E) is false—she feels that ordinary people can cope on their own—and Joyce might well agree. After all, Joyce says that in the past, “specialists” were needed to synthesize and explain knowledge. One can be a specialist without being an expert, so Joyce might well agree with Mary that (E) isn’t strictly true.

5. (E)

Weakening an argument doesn’t mean *disproving* it; it means making the conclusion less *likely* to be true.

To weaken an argument that the deceased “would have had [no] objection to” the executors selling the farm

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rather than giving it to the grandson, we simply need counterevidence that casts doubt as to the authors certainty. If the grandson, “of whom she was very fond,” had said again and again **(E)** that he wanted the farm, at the very least there’s now a 50-50 chance that grandma—despite her silence on the matter—would have wanted him to have it. And 50-50 is enough.

Since the executor has to clear the debts, **(A)** is an argument for the sale of the farm and the grandson is beside the point. The vague “I’ll take care of you” **(B)** can’t be construed as an expression of the specific promise “I’ll give you the farm”; for all we know the grandson was taken care of in the bequest, albeit not with the gift of a farm. The deceased’s awareness of the executor’s position **(C)** would seem to put a greater burden on her to have expressed her wishes about the farm pre-mortem. **(D)**, meanwhile, distorts the issue of *paying* the debts vs. the *cause* of the debts; the latter is certainly irrelevant here.

6. (B)

To figure out a statement’s role, start with the basics: evidence...conclusion.

The first sentence—“we can’t easily solve our food shortage problem”—is the conclusion because everything else answers the question “Why not?” Three possible solutions are described as well as the problem with each: Foreign food shipments would undermine the country’s self-sufficiency; effective outside food delivery would cause local food producers to fold up; and foreign capital would drive up killer inflation. Each of those is support for the initial claim, and the last of those is the phrase in question, so **(B)** is correct.

(A) and **(C)** both reflect an optimism about the country’s self-sufficiency that is nowhere present; that there are “prospects” (line 5) for some doesn’t mean that those prospects are rosy. Meanwhile, **(D)** and **(E)** reflect the first and second of the possible solutions described, but each of those is independent of the third.

7. (B)

There is often little difference between strengtheners and assumptions.

The recommendation of employee schedule flexibility is designed to improve the sleep deprivation problem, so the author must think that the one has something to do with the other. Whether you see **(B)** as an assumption the author is making, or as support for an assumption,

either way **(B)** makes the conclusion more likely to follow from the evidence.

(A) actually weakens the argument, since it suggests that fixing the sleep deprivation problem would be better accomplished by dealing with employees’ overwork rather than their schedule flexibility. **(C)** and **(E)** may well be true, but schedule flexibility wouldn’t affect how *long* people sleep **(C)** or how long people work **(E)**, but *when* they sleep and work. **(D)** is a past-tense hypothetical—“what if such and such hadn’t happened?”—that has no impact on the present recommendation.

8. (A)

The method of an LSAT writer’s argument often has a lot to do with sufficiency and necessity.

The objection to the definition is that in the case of clairvoyance, meeting the sufficient condition of “true belief formed by reliable process” would *still* not make people accept clairvoyant statements as “knowledge”—hence, to the objectors, the conditions *aren’t* sufficient and the definition of knowledge is faulty. The author’s rebuttal wisely points out that the objection shifts the scope: Clairvoyance isn’t accepted as reliable (if it were, we would accept its claims as knowledge), so the counterobjection isn’t on the mark. **(A)** explains that.

(B) is a 180 because the author asserts that the unreliability of clairvoyance makes it impossible to yield knowledge. **(C)** is a 180, too, because she defends rather than rebuts that unreliability. Since the question stem itself reveals that the author is defending the definition, she’d hardly set out to *reframe* that definition as **(D)** suggests. And **(E)** falls short in two ways: It ignores the fact that the author says that she *could* concede clairvoyance as yielding knowledge (if it were seen as reliable); and it simply doesn’t speak to the defense of the definition against the objection, as the question demands (and as **(A)** does).

9. (C)

Use all Keyword signals as to the author’s point.

The speaker concedes a string of facts (“I agree that,” “I do not deny that,” “Indeed, I would not disagree if”) before letting the other shoe drop like so: “But in asking you to concur with me that Hogan’s action be not wholly condemned,...” That “wholly” is really all you need to see, for it indicates that the purpose is to absolve Hogan of some but not all responsibility, and that’s **(C)**.

(A) goes too far, flying in the face of “wholly”; the first three sentences concede much blame to Hogan. The

Section IV: Logical Reasoning

west-side robbers only appearance in the story was in Hogan's head, motivating Hogan's actions toward Winters, so the robber cannot possibly be blameworthy **(B)**. **(D)** is true, but is the speaker's evidence for his conclusion; if you say **(C)** aloud, then the word "because," and then **(D)**, you'll have the argument in a nutshell. **(E)** sums up Hogan's blameworthiness, but if that were the whole story, "but" and the text that follows wouldn't be there.

10. (E)

Never assume that a second speaker always disagrees with the first.

[You might want to read question 11's explanation first, because it deals with Peter, the first speaker.] "Indeed, in fact" signals Jennifer's agreement with Peter's conclusion that farmers should not overwater. But *her* evidence comes from a different but related place: She approvingly cites the greater likelihood that underwatered plants will develop poisons to kill insects. So her point is the same as his, but she cites alternative evidence for it, and that's **(E)**.

Jennifer can't be supporting **(A)** or explaining **(C)** Peter's claims because each person's evidence focuses on a different factor. And as such, she can't be supplying a missing premise **(B)** either. Meanwhile, "indeed/in fact" tells us that Jennifer is in the business of reinforcing Peter's recommendation, not undermining it **(E)**.

11. (C)

An argument is strengthened when an alternative to its conclusion is rendered unlikely.

Peter's argument is one of underwatering, which he implies make leaves less desirable to insect predators than the less-tough leaves produced by abundant watering. But what about the dangers of underwatering? For the argument to work, it would be well to demonstrate that there are no such dangers, or at least that they are less troublesome than the dangers caused by insect predators. That's why **(C)** strengthens the logic—it assures us that we are wise to have drought-stress (underwatering) damage take a back seat to insect damage.

(A) creates an irrelevant comparison between plant leaves; it makes the logic of underwatering no better and no worse. **(B)** suggests that industrialized countries are in big insect predator trouble because their plants are so well watered, but that's not a point in favor of the author's recommendation, just a heads-up that those big countries better get busy. Farmers

may not be able to control rainfall, as **(D)** suggests, but they **are** able to control how much *additional* water they provide, and it's the latter that falls within the author's scope. If anything **(E)** slightly *weakens* the argument, by presenting a single instance (albeit complicated by a strange, irrelevant comparison between bugs) of a predator preference for underwatered leaves.

12. (A)

If you're asked for an assumption, consider whether something in the conclusion fails to be mentioned in the evidence.

The conclusion (signaled by "Thus") is the first we hear of the term "people cannot feel secure." The author must be assuming that people's sense of security ties in somehow to their knowledge of whether their actions are legal. And the tie is necessity, as **(A)** points out. For the argument to work, a necessary condition of people's secure feeling must be their certain knowledge of legality. Then, the author can deduce—as he does—that under vague laws such security is impossible, because under vague laws that certainty is impossible (that is, the necessary condition cannot be met).

(B) is doomed because of "might not feel secure," which is too conditional and meek for the terms of this argument. **(C)** reverses the desired relationship; if certain knowledge of legality is *sufficient* for making people secure, we are no closer to drawing the conclusion that insecurity is impossible under vague laws. *Necessity* is what's called for. *Not-vague* laws **(D)** play no part in the argument, and **(E)** gets the time sequence backward by citing a feeling of security as necessary for a certain knowledge of legality.

13. (A)

The source of a logical flaw must be found within the scope as established by the author.

The sweeping, two-part conclusion both denies the cause of psychoses (i.e. it's not environmental) and asserts their cause (i.e. it's purely organic), all because the best treatment of psychoses is medicinal, whereas the right treatment for neuroses—some of which are caused by environmental factors—is traditional psychotherapy. **(A)** essentially points out that the phenomena the author cites are not mutually exclusive. If environmental factors can cause organic conditions or make them worse, then it's quite possible that psychoses caused by organic conditions **do** have an environmental cause.

Far from ignoring **(B)**, the author *states* that medicine can alleviate psychoses that he believes are caused by

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organic factors. *Nonpsychological illnesses (C)* are outside the scope; this ¶ is completely focused on psychological ones. Extending the scope to *all medical conditions (D)* is even further removed from pinpointing the flaw in this ¶. If anything, *(E)* casts doubt on the cause of *neuroses*, but is far removed from the conclusion about psychoses that the right answer is designed to weaken.

14. (C)

Arguments are most vulnerable when the author shifts the scope between evidence and conclusion.

The author finds developing tech expertise for “tomorrow’s job market” to be useless, no better than a traditional education, because most of our machines are designed to be used by non-experts. She has committed a scope shift here—from everyday machines to machines used in the workplace—and it’s a shift that *(C)* must paper over if the argument is to work. Without *(C)*, it’s quite possible that the machines needed in tomorrow’s job market will require exactly the kind of high-tech education that the author has blasted as unnecessary.

The numbers receiving one type of education or another *(A)* has nothing to do with the wisdom of one type or another. *(B)* merely reinforces the superfluity of expertise when it comes to today’s machines, but it leaves the key scope shift unaddressed. This author wouldn’t assume *(D)* because she denies the very *need* for tech expertise. And by focusing solely on learning, rather than operating, *(E)* falls outside the scope of the whole discussion.

15. (A)

Principle questions are closely related to “parallel reasoning”: Both ask for a one-to-one matchup of essential elements.

Did the stimulus make you think of “the boy who cried wolf”? Its logic is simply that your claims had better be solid, because if they’re not, people won’t believe you later on even when your claims are stronger. This logic would hold for both environmentalists’ claims about the threat of water pollution, and managers’ claims about the need for new employees—*(A)*. And *(A)* would be right even if this question was self-labeled as parallel reasoning.

(B) may seem superficially parallel, but it doesn’t involve a recommendation that the politicians’ evidence be strong, and doesn’t end in the politicians’ not being believed. *(C)* is a recommendation as to what is persuasive, not an injunction against

sabotaging one’s own credibility. *(D)* would be better if it ended “otherwise, legislators won’t believe the lobbyist when their careers really *are* at stake.” *(E)* simply means that if one doesn’t appeal in a certain way, the opposite of the desired effect will come about; this lacks the “boy who cried wolf” element essential to the stimulus and to *(A)*.

16. (D)

Whenever you read an argument, be listening for necessary and sufficient conditions.

The conclusion that reptiles cannot reason in a complex way is based on a single premise—that they can’t materially alter their behavior. The author must see the latter as a necessary condition of the former, and that’s *(D)*.

(A) has the relationship reversed, a classic wrong answer type when the right answer focuses on necessity. The author need not assume anything about “all reptile behaviors” *(B)*; *(B)* counters the psychologists’ claim but doesn’t underlie the author’s conclusion. As far as this argument is concerned, “complex” refers to the reasoning, not to the behavior *(C)*. The author might or might not agree with *(E)*—proof positive that it’s not a necessary assumption—because *(E)* never mentions behavior alteration.

17. (D)

Don’t try to predict an inference; just understand the individual statements and compare the choices to them.

(A) creates an irrelevant distinction between painting and sculpture—irrelevant because the statements hinge on a distinction between music and other arts.

(B) isn’t necessarily true, because a general history of art, having explained every aesthetic feature of music, would have to go on to do likewise for other arts. *(B)* falls short of that.

(C) isn’t necessarily true because its topic is “any theory of art,” whereas the statements all deal with any “*general* theory of art.” A small, but powerful and real, distinction.

(D) is deducible from the third and first sentences. If a premodern general theory must neglect music, and if the purpose of such a theory is to explain every art, then it can never achieve that purpose...unless, of course, music were somehow exempted from the definition of art. *(D)* gets all of that right.

(E) is not inferable, partly because *(D)* **is** (there can only be one right answer!) and partly because the

Section IV: Logical Reasoning

author never mentions *which* aesthetic features of music fail to be explained by postmodern general theory. Maybe they're the ones shared with painting and sculpture, and maybe they're not.

18. (B)

The right answer to an assumption question passes the Kaplan Denial Test—that is, if the statement is denied, the argument has been damaged.

Taking issue with the idea that we should accept ourselves and not be dissatisfied, the author insists that true happiness requires us to pursue personal excellence and be willing to change. This presumes, of course, that these things are mutually exclusive—that one cannot both be satisfied with oneself *and* pursue excellence. If **(B)** is false—if contrary to **(B)** those satisfied with themselves are just as likely to pursue personal excellence—then the author's recipe for happiness can coexist with the principle of "accepting oneself" that he discredits, and the conclusion about that "bad principle" goes up in smoke.

Certainly the author believes that those *unwilling* to change will probably be *unhappy*, but **(A)** goes too far in the other direction. **(C)** focuses on the mere *acquisition* of personal excellence, but it is the "pursuit" of same that is central to the argument. The author never takes a stand on when one can or should be content with oneself **(D)**; indeed, it sounds as if to him, true happiness hinges on *never* being content with oneself. Nothing in the argument mentions, or even hints at, the "painfulness" **(E)** of anything.

19. (B)

When you're asked for a parallel flaw, you can reject any choice that is proper logic, and any choice demonstrating a different flaw.

Father likes turnips but not potatoes. So how can one deduce, based on father, anything about people who *like* potatoes? One can't. In the same way, **(B)**'s first sentence is about a non-novel, yet **(B)** goes on to draw a conclusion about novels. Note that if the terms in the stimulus's "So" sentence and **(B)**'s "Thus" sentence were reversed, each argument would be repaired. That the same repair works for both makes it even more certain that they're parallel.

(A) is great but for the word "some," which has no parallel in the stimulus. **(C)** is proper logic: One can deduce that this house is pre-1900 based on the evidence. **(D)** is superficially similar in form to the stimulus, but **(D)** is actually proper logic: Erica *is*, as **(D)** argues, an exception to the rule that all who love

physics love pure math. **(E)**'s conclusion just reverses its two terms; that's a logical error but not the same one as in the original.

20. (B)

Seek a close, 1:1 matchup of principle and situation.

The critic's point is that one can support freedom of speech and also limit TV violence, because of a relative difference in the amount of damage caused. Agree or disagree, you have to see that **(B)** would support this point of view; controlling TV violence would be an "other interest" that **(B)** says can sometimes "override" free speech.

(A) only goes part way, because the author wants both the consequences of non-passage to be contrasted with the consequences of unlimited free speech. **(C)** confuses enhancing "happiness" with reducing harm to society, and confuses "number of people" with "amount of harm." **(D)** puts things too simply and too bluntly; the author delicately wants to balance some lessening of free speech with the benefits of reduced TV violence, but **(D)** applies a sledgehammer and reduces the argument to mere cause-and-effect. **(E)**, too, goes too far; we cannot be sure that the limitations on TV violence in the legislation amount to "impinging on a basic freedom."

21. (B)

Remember that a logical flaw is a situation in which the evidence does not, for whatever reason, lead to the conclusion.

In this unusual twist on the standard logical flaw question, you first have to decide who has committed the logical misstep, and then describe it. Sandy is mentioned in three choices, but actually hers is the sounder reasoning. There's no problem with her suggestion that "it's best to play" Bigbucks after a few winner-less weeks, because she never defines "best" as "most likely to win." Her point is that after a few winner-less weeks there's a bigger prize, and there's no arguing with that. **(A)**, **(C)**, and **(E)** are all wrong because Sandy makes no judgment call on the chances of winning.

It's Alex who makes the boo-boo, because his suggestion makes no sense. In a game that's won by picking five numbers, how could your chances of winning be affected by the number of other players? **(B)** points out the fallacy in Alex's arguing that Sandy is "more likely to win" when the player pool is small. As for **(D)**, it points at Alex, all right, but Alex makes no reference to past week's winners.

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22. (E)

When an author is explaining a phenomenon, one of his assumptions is that there are no conditions working *against* that explanation.

The topic is coffee, the scope is the difference in price between decaf (pricey) and regular (cheap), and the purpose is to refute an explanation for that difference: It's *not* because of the higher cost of producing decaf. How come? Because taking the caffeine out of beans is inexpensive. But, you might ask in objection, what about any *other* costs of making decaf? For the argument to work those other costs must be negligible, which is why **(E)** is correct. The cost of beans is inferably a major part of producing coffee, and if **(E)** were false and the beans that turn into decaf are much more expensive, then the conclusion would be damaged.

If processing regular coffee **(A)** can be deemed part of the cost, then **(A)** tends to create a paradox, because the first premise here is that *decaf* is the costlier item. **(B)** might be where the author goes next—i.e. an explanation of what *does* account for the higher price of decaf—but doesn't underlie his argument against the cost explanation. The presence or absence of competition **(C)** is outside the argument's scope, as are retailers' expectations and consumers' preferences **(D)**.

23. (C)

When you're asked to identify the author's conclusion, stay close to the topic and scope.

The author takes exception to the use of fewer and smaller strikes as evidence that Britain's unions are weaker. He believes that "strong unions do not need to call strikes" because other means are available to them. The rebuttal is summed up by **(C)**.

All four of the wrong choices go astray because they fail to pick up on the purpose of the ¶, that is, to rebut the newspaper's claim.

24. (C)

Come up with your own prediction of a method of argument answer before you get bogged down in the choices.

(C) has it right: The author takes the very evidence (few and tiny strikes) used by the paper to belittle unions, and shows that it can speak to unions' strength.

Far from questioning the evidence's accuracy **(A)** the author accepts it and uses it to his own ends. The author's evidence is interpretive rather than historical

(B) and no hint of "outdatedness" appears. In questioning the article's conclusion the author does not impugn its writer's motives **(D)** nor does he need to; **(E)** seems to put its toe in the water of impugning motives as well.

25. (D)

"Vulnerable to criticism" signals you to seek a logical flaw.

Is a musical scale popular because of "social conditioning" or "innate dispositions"? The author rejects the former and says that the latter is the "only" attributable cause of diatonic music's popularity. But if it's not an either/or situation—if *both* could be a contributor to a scale's popularity—then that would cast serious doubt on the conclusion. **(D)** sums up the flaw.

"Appreciation" is never mentioned (we can't infer that it is the same as "popularity"), and in any case the argument doesn't take up the popularity of non-diatonic music, so both **(A)** and **(B)** can be rejected. The author is trying to explain why a type of music is popular, not **(C)** why multiple types of music exist at all. Nonhuman species **(E)** are probably about as far outside the scope as one can get.

26. (B)

Read question stems carefully for clues, and sometimes for a statement of the conclusion itself.

The argument for a fifth universal force hinges on fairly technical experiments and terminology, but even we laypersons can appreciate that the argument will be strengthened if it can be proved that the theory doesn't violate any of the other laws and scientific "truth" we already know of. So **(B)** is what we're looking for.

(A) suggests that the fifth force couldn't have been located before 1970, but that doesn't make the argument for its existence any more plausible now that the technology is in place. **(C)** is a 180: By suggesting a plausible alternative to a fifth force, it tends to weaken the argument. So would a lack of precision in the experimentation **(D)**. As for **(E)**, a theory's appearance during a time of discoveries doesn't make that theory any more (or less) likely. Each discovery needs to be assessed on its own merits.

SECTION V: LOGIC GAMES

Game 1: "Fruit Stand"

Questions 1–6

Situation: a fruit stand. **Entities:** fruits available to be carried by the stand. **Action:** to choose the group of fruits out of the larger pool. **Limitations:** We have to pick "at least one kind" out of six; the fact that we're not given a definite number is an impediment, but not much of a one. The numbers will work themselves out in each question. Our standard Master Sketch for "grouping games of selection" is a list of entities to be circled or X'd out as circumstances dictate.

All four rules are in if/then form, which means that the selection process is totally speculative: *If* a certain selection is or is not made, that's a trigger for some result that will *then* occur. Odds are that none of the rules can be built into the picture. They'll all have to be jotted down nearby.

Rule 1's contrapositive reads "If the stand carries pears then it doesn't carry kiwis," which means that the rule boils down to "I can never choose both pears and kiwis," or "NEVER KP" in your nearby scratchwork. Note that the rule doesn't mean "one or the other" (the rule permits us to choose neither kiwis nor pears), but simply that the moment we pick one of the two fruits, the other is to be tossed out.

Rule 2 means that if we reject one of either tangerines or kiwis, then we must choose the other. That in turn means that the minimum "at least one kind" carried by the fruit stand must be K or T. Ergo, either K or T will always be chosen. Jot that down as well.

Rule 3 states that the selection of oranges mandates the selection of two other fruits, "P and W." Since in the contrapositive "and" becomes "or," we are to understand this rule as meaning *If either P or W is rejected, then O must be rejected as well*

Meanwhile, **Rule 4** reminds us that in the contrapositive, "or" becomes "and." Given that if W is chosen, F or T is chosen, then it has to be true that *If both F and T are rejected, W is rejected*. It should all look like so:

Never KP
Pick K or T, minimum
F K O P T W
 $O \rightarrow P \text{ and } W$
 $\text{no } P \text{ or no } W \rightarrow \text{no } O$
 $W \rightarrow F \text{ or } T$
 $\text{no } F \text{ and no } T \rightarrow \text{no } W$

Don't spin your wheels deducing anything from this list of hypotheticals. Proceed to the questions and start racking up points.

1. (B)

Use the rules to toss out the violators.

Rule 1 means that any choice including "K + P" is a violator, so we can reject (E). Rule 2 means that the correct answer must include, at minimum, K or T, so we can toss (A) and (C). And Rule 3 knocks out (D), and would knock out (A) too if (A) were still under contention, because each gives us oranges without the pear + watermelon requirement. (B) is the winner by default.

2. (D)

"Could be" means "possible," and the absence of an if-clause means that the answer is deducible from the rules alone.

We already deduced the answer to this question from Rule 2. If only one fruit is chosen, then either Rule 2's if ("If the stand doesn't carry tangerines...") or its contrapositive's if ("If the stand doesn't carry kiwis...") will be confirmed. One of those triggers will get pulled, in other words, and that in turn means that we must always select either kiwis or tangerines, respectively. Either could have appeared as the right answer; the testmakers put the latter into (D).

3. (E)

"All EXCEPT acceptability" is a little tougher, because you can't be sure which of the rules is the one that the right answer violates.

The search doesn't take long, as it turns out. Rule 1 means we can never choose kiwis + pears, but (E) does just that. End of story.

4. (C)

A new if-clause usually means: Draw a picture.

In question 4's roster of the six fruits, we should cross out "W" in light of the question stem. Then we check

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our rules to decide what result that information triggers. According to Rule 3's contrapositive, rejecting W means rejecting O, so cross O out. Of the remaining fruits (F K P T) we can never choose both K and P (Rule 1), so **(C)** is correct: Three out of the "F K P T" quartet is the limit. (The minimum, as usual, is one: either K or T.) The other choices are all possible but by no means necessarily true.

5. (E)

If the right answer must be false, the four wrong choices are either true or possibly true.

We circle "W" on a roster for Question 5, and in line with Rule 4, we know that we'll have to circle F or T or both. But which? Instead of staring at it and hoping that a short cut occurs to you, your best bet is to work out the three possibilities quickly: figs only; tangerines only; or both:

F K O P W
 or
 K O P T W
 or
 F K O P T W

The first of the three possibilities takes us furthest. Either kiwis or tangerines must be chosen, minimum (Rule 2), and since T is crossed out K must be circled. Selecting kiwis (Rule 1) means rejecting pears:

F K O W

You don't even need to explore the oranges, because when you study all three possibilities you see that **(E)** is impossible: There's no situation in which P is selected but T is not. The others are variously possible under one or more of the three situations.

6. (C)

When a rule is removed, you must start from scratch. The removal of Rule 2 removes our certainty that at least K or T must always be chosen. Other than that, the rules stay in effect, and since this is an "all are acceptable EXCEPT" question we need only compare each rule to the choices, hoping to find a violator sooner rather than later. Choice **(C)** includes

watermelons without (Rule 4) either figs or tangerines, so **(C)** is a violator and the correct answer here. Note that **(A)** and **(B)** were previously forbidden when Rule 2 was in play, but are now possible; **(D)** and **(E)** don't violate rules either.

Section V: Logic Games

Game 2: "Radio Talk Show Calls"

Questions 7–13

Situation: a radio talk show is assembling a series of calls from listeners. **Entities:** the callers; their nature (live or taped); and their cities of origin. **Action:** This is a hybrid game, because not only must we sequence the callers but must match them up to their nature and city. **Limitations:** A mixture of certainty and ambiguity here. We know the names of the callers to be sequenced, and we know the cities with exactitude (2 Vancouver, 2 Seattle, 1 Kellyowna). What's unclear is how many of the 5 are taped and how many live. But that will become clearer in due course. The Master Sketch can incorporate both the sequencing and matching, to wit:

F G H I M	1	2	3	4	5
Van Van Sea Sea Kel	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
I, t	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

Look like a lot of detail? Happily, the rules are very forthcoming—especially if you attack them in an order that's logical rather than random.

Let's scan the rules and start with the ones dealing with the sequence of callers. Isaac and Mel (**Rule 1**) start off the list in either order; so they'll take slots 1 and 2, leaving slots 3-5 for the remaining callers. And what do you know: Gwen and Felicia (**Rule 4**) follow Henry in the sequence. Clearly, Henry will have to be caller 3, with Gwen and Felicia taking slots 4 and 5 in either order. So much for the caller sequence. Keep jotting this stuff down.

Rule 2 is a definite one: call #3 is taped and is the one and only call from Kellyowna. Henry is the one in slot #3, so the remaining callers will split 2 Seattle/2 Vancouver, in some fashion. **Rule 5** takes us a step further. *Turn negatives into positives!* If Mel and Felicia—two of the non-Kellyowna callers—don't call from Seattle, then each of them *does* call from Vancouver! And so the Seattle callers are Isaac and Gwen! Your sketch so far:

1	2	3	4	5
<u>I</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>H</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>F</u>
<u>Sea</u>	<u>Van</u>	<u>Kel</u>	<u>Sea</u>	<u>Van</u>
		<u>t</u>		

The final rule we're considering, **Rule 3**, now ties in beautifully. We know whom the Seattle callers are—Isaac and Gwen—so it all looks like so:

1	2	3	4	5
<u>I</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>H</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>F</u>
<u>Sea</u>	<u>Van</u>	<u>Kel</u>	<u>Sea</u>	<u>Van</u>
<u>I</u>	<u>?</u>	<u>t</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>?</u>

And the only wide-open issue is the nature, live or taped, of Vancouver callers Mel and Felicia. There are a lot of entities and rules, so working all of this out takes a lot of time. But watch how quickly the questions fall.

7. (E)

When you've worked out a lot of facts in your Master Sketch, you can answer questions quickly.

This question only deals with the sequencing of the names, and can be answered even more quickly than most because we know that the sequence can only be I/M in either order, followed by H, followed by G/F in either order. Only **(E)** lives up to that sequence.

8. (A)

When a question comes without an if-clause, endeavor to read the answer right off your Master Sketch.

As we've just seen, Felicia's call must be #4 or #5. The latter is possible, so **(A)** is correct. The other four choices all violate what we know about the sequence.

9. (C)

When a question comes with an if-clause, THINK about the clause: Ask yourself, what does it MEAN?

We know that the sequence begins with Isaac-from-Seattle or Mel-from-Vancouver. Question 9's if-clause is a coy way of telling us that it's Isaac #1 and Mel #2. And never mind "could be"; in fact, correct answer **(C)** *must* be true. The other four choices, just as

10. (C)

If the right answer "CANNOT be true," then the wrong choices could or must be true.

If, as the question demands, a taped call is #1, that lets out Isaac, whose call must be live (it's from Seattle, after all—Rule 3). So the sequence will begin with Mel's taped call as #1 and Isaac's live call as #2...making **(C)** correct: Call #2 is live, not taped.

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(A) and (B) are either both true or both false, no way to tell, and (E) is possible if Felicia's call is taped and fourth; but none of them hinges on the taped nature of call #1. (D) we know to be true from Rule 2.

11. (A)

Even a late question may be a slam-dunk, requiring only a look at the sketch or a brief bit of deduction.

(A) is something we deduced at the end of Step 4 of the Kaplan 5-Step Method. Gwen, as a Seattle caller, makes a live call. (B) and (E) are dead wrong, while (C) and (D) are possible only.

12. (A)

Turn negatives into positives.

All that the two lengthy if-clauses are getting at is that the calls somehow alternate, live/tape, never two of the same in a row. The implications should be clear from the Master Sketch. With Henry in the middle as taped call #3, the taped calls must be the odd numbered ones, and even numbers 2 and 4 must be live. And we have two live callers—Seattle-based Isaac and Gwen; so based on what we know in the sketch we can see that they must take slots 2 and 4 respectively. That leaves Mel for call #1 and Felicia for call #5, and so (A) has it right: I M H G F is the only possible sequence.

13. (B)

Use your pencil to turn new if-clauses into concrete situations.


Once again we can confirm the opening of the sequence. If as we're told call #2 is taped, we must begin with Isaac #1, leaving Mel as #2, so he must make a taped call. If you picked (A), which is true (Isaac #1 is from Seattle), you forgot the question: We're asked for a *false* statement. And that's (B).

As in previous questions, the facts about the back end of the sequence (Gwen vs. Felicia) don't hinge on what we know about the front end, so all of the remaining choices are possible.


Game 3: "Bus Riders"

Questions 14–18

Situation: a bus ride. **Entities:** the riders' names. **Action:** to assign them—sequence them—to their rows and their seats. **Limitations:** The arithmetic is basic—six seats and six rows—complicated by the distinction between window and aisle, and by the complexity of the rules (four of which are in the higher-difficulty if/then form). Let's begin by sketching a simple overhead view, with a clear indication of which are the window seats:



Avoiding the if's for the moment, let's focus on more-concrete **Rule 1**. We should always look for opportunities to create limited options, and this is one such. If Gutierrez and Hoffman occupy aisle seats, and the former's is immediately behind the latter's, then there are only two options and we can so label them for ourselves:




The remaining rules cannot be built into the sketch because they're all hypothetical—if something happens, then it triggers some result—so we can follow our normal procedure and be sure we understand each rule and its contrapositive before sketching them.

Rule 2: If Moore's in an aisle (i.e. one of the remaining ones in either option), then Lapas will sit in a window seat next to Hoffman. And therefore, if Lapas and Hoffman are in different rows, then Moore sits in a window seat.

Rule 3: If Kelly sits in a window seat next to Gutierrez (see sketches), then Moore sits right behind Imamura. Notice that this rule can *only* apply to Option I, since in Option II Kelly and Gutierrez would be sitting in row 2, effectively separating Moore and Imamura. (And in Option I, notice that that would leave Lapas for row 3's aisle seat!) Anyhow, the contrapositive means that if Moore and Imamura are not back to back, then Gutierrez and Kelly are separated, and that's so vague it's probably not even worth drawing.

Rule 4: Pretty straightforward. If Kelly takes a window seat, then Moore sits in row 3. Contrapositive: If Moore's in row 1 or 2, then Kelly takes an aisle seat.

Rule 5: Since putting Kelly in row 2 puts Imamura in row 1, it follows that if Imamura is in row 2 or 3, then Kelly is in row 1 or 3. It all looks like so:



- $M \text{ aisle} \rightarrow \underline{L H}$
- $\text{Not } \underline{L H} \rightarrow M \text{ window}$
- $\text{If } \underline{K G} \rightarrow (\text{OP.1}) \underline{K G}$
- $\underline{I H}$
- $\underline{M L}$
- $K \text{ window} \rightarrow M_3$
- $M_{1 \text{ or } 2} \rightarrow K \text{ aisle}$
- $K_3 \rightarrow I_1$
- $I_{2 \text{ or } 3} \rightarrow K_{1 \text{ or } 3}$

14. (E)

Expect the game's first question to be easy—certainly easier than it looks. This is true maybe 95% of the time.

At first glance this one seems messy and time-consuming: no if-information added, nothing clean or clear-cut. But before you start despairing, or drawing pictures mindlessly, you should let your eye compare the choices and the rules. Take a gander at whether the rules help you narrow your work down. And they do.

According to Rule 2, if Moore takes an aisle seat, Hoffman sits next to Lapas; but **(D)** has Moore in an aisle seat with Moore himself next to Lapas. That's a violation; **(D)** is impossible.

(C) is even simpler to throw out. Gutierrez (says Rule 1) sits in an aisle seat. But **(C)** puts him next to the window. And **(A)** violates Rule 5's contrapositive: If Imamura is in row 2 (i.e. "not in row 1") then Kelly cannot sit in row 3—yet there Kelly is, in **(A)**.

(B) is impossible because of the deduction we made from Rule 3. If Gutierrez sits in the same row as Kelly, then Moore sits right behind Imamura. This can only be Option I since in Option II Kelly and Gutierrez would be in row 2, separating Moore and Imamura. In Option I Kelly and Guterrez are in row 1 and therefore cannot sit behind Moore.

Here's another way to approach it. If, as **(B)** says, the aisle-seated Gutierrez shares a row with Kelly and is

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just behind Moore, then we're working with Option II (in Option I, where Gutierrez sits in row 1, he sits behind no one). But there's a problem putting Moore in row 1 and Gutierrez and Kelly in row 2: If Kelly sits in a window seat—where we've just put him—then Moore must sit in row 3 (Rule 5), not row 1. This won't do either.

We're left with **(E)**. And indeed, in Option I Moore and Kelly can occupy row 3 in either order. The rest of the bus will be (window/aisle respectively): row 1, Imamura, Gutierrez; row 2, Lapas, Hoffman. **(E)** is possible and hence correct.

15. (A)

For "could be true" questions, you can always engage in some careful trial & error...or just skip the question altogether.

That the question stem doesn't hint at *which* window seats, and that Lapas and Kelly can take window seats in both Options, means that there are a lot of possibilities...perhaps too many to work out fully. This is an instance in which trying the choices is probably the fastest way.

For instance, if **(A)** is right, then we should be able to assign Moore row 3's aisle while giving window seats to Lapas and Kelly. Try it, in Option I, the only one in which row 3's aisle is available. Putting M there triggers Rule 2, and Hoffman and Lapas must therefore share row 2. We can't assign Gutierrez with Kelly in row 1 here (Rule 3), so it'll be Imamura and Gutierrez in row 1; Lapas and Hoffman in row 2; and Kelly and Moore in row 3. Nothing wrong with that; **(A)** is possible, so it's correct.

End of story. We needn't even stop to prove that placing Imamura in row 3's aisle forces at least one rule violation **(B)**; that in the course of working out **(A)** we saw that **(C)** was impossible; that placing Moore with Gutierrez in row 1 or 2, when Kelly has a window seat, blatantly violates Rule 4 **(D)**; or that in neither Option can Moore and Lapas share a row without violating rules **(E)**.

16. (D)

When you encounter a very hard question, chances are the one that follows it will be easier.

So Moore sits in row 1, eh? Which seat? Work it out with your pencil. If it's the aisle seat, uh oh: Giving aisle seats to Moore, Gutierrez, and Hoffman leaves window seats for the rest; but with Kelly in a window seat Moore must be in row 3, not row 1 (Rule 4). So Moore must occupy row 1's *window* seat, and Rule 4's contrapositive kicks in. Since Moore is in row 1, Kelly

must take an aisle seat. And that only works in Option II, with Kelly in row 1's aisle seat next to Moore (if we used Option I, putting Moore and Gutierrez together in row 1 and Kelly in row 3's aisle seat, Rule 5 would be violated). In the end, then, under these circumstances row 1 will seat Moore (window) and Kelly (aisle), and that's **(D)**.

Of the wrong choices, **(A)** is false and the others possible only.

17. (B)


When in doubt, gravitate toward the questions that contain the most concrete information.

This one is even more desirable than the ones that precede it. Question 15 mentions window seat holders with no hint as to their rows, and question 16 places someone in a row with no hint as to his seat. But here we know exactly the slot for Kelly, which means Option I in which Gutierrez and Hoffman take the aisle seats in rows 1 and 2 respectively. With Kelly in row 3, Rule 5 puts Imamura into row 1 (the window seat's available); and the remaining window seats go to Lapas and Moore in either order. Of the choices, only **(B)** falls short of certainty. Hoffman *can* share a row with Lapas but need not.

18. (C)

Turn negatives into positives.

If Gutierrez isn't in row 1, then clearly we're working with Option II here (and just as clearly, **(A)** and **(D)** are impossible: Hoffman is in row 3, and Imamura is in a window seat). As for the remaining choices, let's try them out. Remember, the sketch looks like this:



(B)—If Kelly is in row 2, it's the window seat, meaning the Rule 4 kicks in, and Moore must sit in row 3. Uh oh. That leaves row 1 for Imamura, forbidden by the question stem. Move on.

(C)—If Moore is in row 2's window seat, then Imamura is right behind him in row 3, and Kelly and Lapas are left for row 1. No harm in that. **(C)** is possible and thus correct. For the record, if Moore took an aisle seat **(E)**, it'd have to be row 1's, but Kelly'd be left to take a window seat and Rule 4 would be violated.

Game 4: "Pilots & Co-Pilots"

Questions 19–23

Situation: flights needing piloting. **Entities:** planes, pilots, and co-pilots. Action: hybrid. It's largely a matching function, but Rule 1 ("in numerical order") means that it's all to be sequenced as well. **Limitations:** Not many; it's pretty tidy: four flights, four pilots, four co-pilots. Let your **Master Sketch** incorporate both the sequencing and matching, just as Game Two's did; and why mess around? Let's build in **Rule 3** right away:

F	G	X	L		1	2	3	4
r	s	t	u		_____	_____	_____	_____
					_____	_____	_____	_____

Rule 2 is a big one, now that Kyle has been assigned to flight 2. If, as the rule says, Fazio comes before Germond in the sequence and it can't be "FG," then there are only two possibilities: "F _ G" and "F _ _ G." If it's the former, then Kyle separates them and Lopez flies fourth. If it's the latter, Lopez flies third. We have two Options—and a look at **Rule 4** allows us to fill them in further:

OP.1

r	s	t	_____	_____	_____	_____
			_____	_____	_____	_____

OP.2

_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

No other rules remain, but no matter. We'll deal with Reich, Simon, and Taylor during the questions.

19. (A)

Use your Master Sketch.

Only **(A)** is possible given that which we've worked out.

20. (C)

Read every question carefully. A key, non-capitalized word like "cannot," here, is easy to miss.

The question stem must be referring to Option II, since in Option I no flight is later than Umlas's. And so Reich

is assigned to the only slot after Umlas's, flight #4, leaving flights 1 and 2 to Simon and Taylor in either order. Of the choices, **(B)** and **(D)** are certainly true: Except for Germond, *everyone's* flight precedes Reich's. And **(A)** and **(E)** are possible, depending on the order of the first two co-pilots. But **(C)** is impossible. Kyle, as the pilot of flight #2, either flies with Taylor or after him.

21. (D)

If the right answer "could be false," then the four wrong choices are necessarily true.

"Lopez's flight is earlier than Germond's" only in Option II, so there we are again. **(A)**, **(B)**, and **(E)** are readily seen in the Master Sketch. **(C)** is tougher, but indeed, with two co-pilot slots preceding flight 3's Umlas, either Reich or Taylor or both will be needed to fill them (and of course **(C)**'s wording doesn't preclude the possibility that both Reich and Taylor precede Umlas).

(D) is left, and if Simon is assigned to flight #4, which he can be, then **(D)** is a false statement.

22. (C)

When working out numbers, don't rush. Work carefully. In Option I, flight #4's pilot/co-pilot team is Lopez/Umlas, period. In Option II, the flight #4 pilot is Germond, but any of the three co-pilots other than Umlas could fly with him. So the total is four, one from Option I + three from Option II.

23. (D)

When you've worked out Options, carefully see which is/are in play at any given moment.

Simon's flight can be later than Lopez's only if Lopez flies third and we're in Option II, because in Option I Lopez flies last, of course. Assigning Simon to the flight after Lopez, flight #4, leaves Reich and Taylor to split up flights #1 and 2 in either order. If the order is alphabetical then **(D)** is true, but if it's reversed **(D)** is false. All of the other choices can be read off the little sketch you've created for question 23.



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